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391 
REFUSING TO REMOVE AN OBSTACLE TO THE REMEDY: 
THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN TOWN OF CASTLE 
ROCK V. GONZALES1 CONTINUES TO DENY DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE VICTIMS MEANINGFUL RECOURSE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American law has failed to provide women with a meaningful 
remedy against spousal abuse.2  While legislatures have created legal 
remedies for women who suffer from abuse, the judiciary has 
historically been unwilling to enforce legislation capable of providing 
women with meaningful recourse against their abusers.3  Courts have 
interpreted legislation strictly and narrowly, adhering to the common law 
and refusing to remove the obstacles that prevent women from fully 
realizing the law’s protection.4  Following this trend, in Town of Castle 
Rock v. Gonzales, the Supreme Court reiterated that the State has little or 
no responsibility in protecting women from abuse, even when mandated 
by a court order.5 
Domestic violence has plagued our society throughout time and the 
law has failed to eradicate abuse occurring between family members.6  
Common law robbed wives of their legal identities and autonomy 
through the doctrine of coverture.7  When husbands exercised power 
over their wives through violence, the law provided no legal remedy for 
their injuries.8  There was a time when violence was an accepted 
 
 1. 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
 2. See infra notes 28-87; 168-96 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 38-95; 168-90 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 168-90 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 96-167; 197-216 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 31-37; 60-95 and accompanying text. 
 7. See Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 364 (1989).  
See infra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.  William Blackstone described coverture: 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person at law: that is, the very being or legal 
existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least is incorporated and 
consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she 
performs every thing . . . . 
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430. 
 8. See infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text. 
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component of the marital union and common law did not allow women 
to bring lawsuits against their husbands.9  As legislatures began to pass 
legislation authorizing women to bring lawsuits, the Supreme Court 
responded by circumscribing the application of those statutes and 
preventing wives from bringing personal injury suits against their 
husbands, not wanting to open the court doors to domestic disputes.10 
Today, the Court still leaves the doors of justice closed to those 
suffering from domestic abuse.11  While legislatures have sought to 
provide police protection to domestic violence victims by creating court-
issued protection orders and implementing mandatory arrest procedures, 
the Supreme Court has rendered this legislation ineffective, reminding 
the abused that the law continues to deny them a meaningful remedy 
against their abusers.12 
In the midst of the passage of the Married Women’s Property 
Acts,13 while recognizing women’s need for autonomy and increased 
property rights, courts refused to provide women with legal recourse 
against their abusive husbands.14  In 1910, the Supreme Court ignored 
the clear intent of the legislature and failed to apply the legislation in a 
manner consistent with its plain meaning.15  Rather, the Court 
implemented its own policy judgments and stripped from the victims of 
domestic abuse a personal remedy against their abusers.  Similarly, in 
the midst of legislation fortifying court-issued protection orders with 
arrest mandates, the Court refused to provide women with meaningful 
protection against abuse.16  In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,17  the 
Supreme Court ignored the clear intent of the Colorado legislature and 
 
 9. See infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 38-59; 169-90 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 147-67 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 60-95 and accompanying text; See Lynn Hecht Schafran, There’s No 
Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1063, 1068-69 (1995) (“Judges are a critical link in the 
chain of protection for battered women, yet they are the weakest link because they are largely 
unaccountable for their decisions”); see infra notes 238-52. 
 13. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 374 (describing the Married Women’s Property Acts as 
protecting wives’ property from their spouses’ creditors, keeping their earnings from their husbands, 
providing women with ownership and control of their property, permitting women to contract, and 
permitting them to sue without joining their husbands). 
 14. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910).  See infra notes 38-59; 169-90 and 
accompanying text. 
 15. See Thompson, 218 U.S. at 620-25 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  See infra notes 182-190 and 
accompanying text. 
 16. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (holding that a domestic 
abuse victim “did not, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, have a property interest in police 
enforcement of the restraining order against her husband.”). 
 17. 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
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failed to give plain meaning to domestic violence legislation due to its 
own policy concerns.18  The Supreme Court continues to substitute its 
own policy judgments for those of the legislature, thereby preventing the 
victims of domestic abuse from seeking protection through a meaningful 
legal remedy.19 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Roots of Domestic Violence in America: Coverture and 
Chastisement 
Under coverture,20 husband and wife were regarded as one entity; 
however, the wife was stripped of her legal existence.21  Common law 
organized the “domestic” relations of husband and wife as a type of legal 
partnership, where the “woman’s role was secondary to the man’s.”22  
 
 18. See infra notes 191-216 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra notes 262-86 and accompanying text. 
 20. English jurist William Blackstone described coverture: 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person at law: that is, the very being or legal 
existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least is incorporated and 
consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she 
performs every thing; and is therefore called in our law-French a feme-covert . . . under 
the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during 
her marriage is called her coverture . . . . For this reason, a man cannot grant anything to 
his wife, or enter into covenant with her: for the grant would be to suppose her separate 
existence; and to covenant with her, would be only to covenant with himself . . . . The 
husband is bound to provide his wife with the necessaries by law, as much as himself; 
and if she contracts debts for them, he is obligated to pay them . . . . If the wife be 
injured in her person or her property, she can bring no action for redress without her 
husband’s concurrence, and in his name, as well as her own: neither can she be sued . . . . 
But in trials of any sort they are not allowed to be evidence for, or against, each other: 
partly because it is impossible their testimony should be indifferent, but principally 
because of the union of person . . . . But, though our law in general considers man and 
wife as one person, yet there are some instances in which she is separately considered; as 
inferior to him, and acting by his compulsion.  And therefore all deeds executed, and acts 
done, by her, during her coverture, are void . . . . She cannot by will devise lands to her 
husband, unless under special circumstances; for at the time of making it she is supposed 
to be under his coercion . . . . These are the chief legal effects of marriage during 
coverture; upon which we may observe, that even the disabilities, which the wife lies 
under, are for the most part intended for her protection and benefit.  So great a favorite is 
the female sex of the laws of England. 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *430-33. 
 21. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 614 (1910) (“At the common law the husband 
and wife were regarded as one.  The legal existence of the wife during coverture was merged in that 
of the husband . . . .”). 
 22. MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 14 
(1986) (stating that the legal ideal of unity of the person “limited the activities of the wife while 
3
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This marriage partnership was characterized by governance and 
dependence.23 
Coverture imposed many legal disabilities upon a wife.24  A wife 
was unable to make contracts, acquire property, or dispose of property, 
without the consent of her husband.25  Married women could not act as 
executors or administrators of estates or as legal guardians.26  Similarly, 
wives had subservient guardianship rights as to their children.27 
Married women did not have standing to bring lawsuits.28  Thus, at 
common law, a married woman could bring neither civil nor criminal 
actions because the wife’s existence merged into the husband’s.29  In 
contrast, a husband could bring suit in his wife’s name as well as his 
own.30 
With coverture arose “The Rule of the Thumb,” which allowed a 
husband to chastise his wife using a rod or switch that was no greater 
than the girth of his right thumb.31  English common law allowed 
husbands to discipline their wives by using physical force.32  The law 
supported “domestic chastisement,” a husband’s infliction of physical 
force as a form of control, upholding it as a vital part of the patriarchal 
family structure.33  In State v. Rhodes,34 the Supreme Court of North 
 
broadening those of the husband”). 
 23. Id.  Prentice L. White, Stopping the Chronic Batterer Through Legislation: Will It Work 
This Time?, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 709, 716 (2004) (describing the marital relationship as one where the 
husband had a license to “broadcast his superiority in the family and to discredit the wife’s 
individuality and independence”). 
 24. SALMON, supra note 22, at 14 (stating that “[r]estrictions limited a married woman’s 
ability to act at law”). 
 25. Id.  Ariela Dubler, Anika Rahman, Kathy Rodgers & Jane Spinak, Women’s Rights: 
Reframing the Issues for the Future, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 333, 338 (2003). 
 26. SALMON, supra note 22, at 14. 
 27. ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN 
1800-1861 23 (1987) (“The married pair were not equal custodians of their children; he alone was 
considered the natural protector.”). 
 28. SALMON, supra note 22, at 14.  Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 589 (1858). 
 29. Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206, 209 (N.C. 1920). 
 30. SALMON, supra note 22, at 14. 
 31. White, supra note 23, at 715 (noting that Ancient Rome created the Laws of Chastisement 
that permitted husbands to strike their wives as a method of social control).  Since the husband was 
accountable for his wife’s actions, “the ancient common law permitted him to chastise her 
moderately as he would an apprentice who misbehaved.”  WARBASSE, supra note 27, at 22 (citing 
1WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444). 
 32. White, supra note 23, at 715.  However, Elizabeth Bowles Warbasse notes that this 
practice died out in England and English courts began to rule that “the husband who struck his wife 
when not acting in self-defense or to restrain her when insane, committed an act of cruelty which 
was valid cause for separation.”  WARBASSE, supra note 27, at 23. 
 33. White, supra note 23, at 715 (observing that, during this time, a woman was viewed as 
property and could easily be discarded when she committed an act that violated cultural norms).  In 
4
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Carolina condoned a husband’s infliction of physical force upon his 
wife, refusing to raise “the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the 
lesser evil of trifling violence.”35 
In this way, men’s domination and authority over the home was 
regularly reinforced by the state.36  The doors of justice remained closed 
to married women, rendering them powerless to preserve their own 
physical well-being, as these “substantive and procedural disabilities 
under which married females labored made it quite improbable that an 
American court would have recognized a wife’s tort suit against her 
husband.”37 
B. An Attempt to Remove the Obstacle?: The Married Women’s Property 
Acts 
Legislatures finally began attacking coverture by passing the 
Married Women’s Property Acts,38 which modified the common law to 
 
1824, Judge Powhattan Ellis stated: 
[E]very principle of public policy and expediency, in reference to the domestic relations, 
would seem to require, the establishment of the rule we have laid down . . . . To screen 
from public reproach those who may be thus unhappily situated, let the husband be 
permitted to exercise the right of moderate chastisement, in cases of great emergency, 
and use salutary restraints in every case of misbehavior, without being subjected to 
vexatious prosecutions, resulting in the mutual discredit and shame of all parties 
concerned. 
WARBASSE, supra note 27, at 23 (quoting Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 156, 158 (1824)). 
 34. 61 N.C. 453 (1868). 
 35. Id. at 459. 
 36. Id.  Much literature is devoted to figuring out why men abuse their wives.  According to 
commentator Lisa G. Lerman: 
Men are violent and abusive toward women because this behavior allows them to 
establish and to maintain control within the relationships.  Many men engage in this 
behavior because it is effective in maintaining control, and because no one has ever 
required them to stop.  Woman abuse is such a pervasive problem that society, in 
addition to holding the abuser responsible, must take responsibility for rearranging law, 
policy, and social services to prevent domestic abuse. 
Lisa G. Lerman, The Decontextualization of  Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
217, 220 (1992). 
 37. Tobias, supra note 7, at 368-69.  Tobias also cites an observation from an early treatise on 
marriage that “[t]he ‘nature of the connexion between [husband and wife is] such that no [battery] 
can give either a right of action to recover damages.’”  Id. at 371 (quoting T. REEVE, THE LAW OF 
BARON AND FEMME 65 (1st ed. 1816)). 
 38. An example is Maryland’s “Married Women’s Act,” enacted in 1898: 
Married women shall have power to engage in any business, and to contract, whether 
engaged in business or not, and to sue upon their contracts, and also to sue for the 
recovery, security or protection of their property, and for torts committed against them, 
as fully as if they were unmarried; contracts may also be made with them, and they may 
also be sued separately upon their contracts, whether made before or during marriage, 
and for wrongs independent of contract committed by them before or during their 
5
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allow women some legal rights.39  The Married Women’s Property Acts 
created “a new legal structure to govern the relationship between 
husband and wife.”40  Most statutes granted women property rights, the 
ability to contract, and the ability to bring claims and appear in court 
without joining their husbands.41  With respect to a wife’s right to 
litigate, the remedial language employed usually “authorized a married 
woman to maintain an action in her own name, for damages, against any 
person . . . for any injury to her person or character, the same as if she 
were sole.”42 
While these statutes at least partially opened the doors of justice to 
married women, few statutes specifically granted a married woman the 
right to bring an action against her husband for personal injury or 
injunction.43  Furthermore, despite this legislation, public acceptance of 
a husband’s physical control over his wife remained.44  Thus, when 
called to interpret the Married Women’s Property Acts in individual 
cases, judges held fast to the common law,45 and the mandates of the 
legislature were often overcome in instances where the legislation 
curtailed a husband’s authority.46 
 
marriage, as fully as if they were unmarried; and upon judgments recovered against them 
execution may be issued as if they were unmarried; nor shall any husband be liable upon 
any contract made by his wife in her own name and upon her own responsibility, nor for 
any tort committed separately by her out of his presence, without his participation or 
sanction. 
MD ANN. CODE art. 45, § 5 (1957) (repealed 1984).  While this statute has been repealed, its 
provisions still exist in a modern form.  See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-204 (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 Reg. Sess. and 1st Spec. Sess.). 
 39. WARBASSE, supra note 27, at 275-87 (noting that states differed in the liberalness of their 
legislation).  “From almost complete subservience fostered by the common law [the American 
married woman] might, in the most liberal states, assume the financial if not the full personal 
independence possessed by the modern wife.”  Id. at 305. 
 40. Id. at 287. 
 41. Tobias, supra note 7, at 374. 
 42. Id. at 373 (internal quotations omitted). 
 43. Id. at 375. 
 44. Id. at 396 (“[W]hen jurists observed existing society, it may well have been inconceivable 
to them that legislatures could have intended to intrude upon a husband’s control over his wife’s 
body, the most delicate area of the sacrosanct institution of marriage.”). 
 45. Carl Tobias observes that there was technically no common law rule of interspousal tort 
immunity, but the rule is derived from the “fiction of marital merger.”  Id. at 385. 
 46. See, e.g., Husband and Wife.  Separation of Property of the Wife.  Injunction as a Means 
of Judicial Separation, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 676, 676 (1924) (discussing the case of Shipman v. 
Shipman, 40 T.L.R. 348 (1924), which modified an injunction awarded a wife pursuant to a Married 
Women’s Property Act to keep her husband from her residence, finding it “very unlikely that the 
Married Women’s Property acts meant to make the wife’s proprietary right superior to the common 
law right of a husband to enjoy the society of his wife”).  See Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s 
Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1361 (1983) (“[T]he early married women’s acts 
6
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In Thompson v. Thompson,47 a wife brought suit against her 
husband for assault and battery in the District of Columbia.48  This 
action required the Supreme Court to interpret and apply a District of 
Columbia statute passed pursuant to the Married Women’s Property 
Acts.49  The Court addressed the disabilities imposed upon women by 
coverture and recognized that such statutes had been passed to 
emancipate women from their husbands’ control.50  The Court remarked 
that it endeavored to effectuate the legislative purpose underlying the 
statute’s passage.51 
However, while the Court noted that the statute’s language 
authorized a married woman to bring suit for torts committed against her 
“as fully and freely as if she were unmarried,”52 the Court then went on 
to state that “[t]he statute was not intended to give a right of action as 
against the husband.”53  Ignoring the plain meaning of the statute, the 
Court justified its interpretation, stating that it gave “a reasonable effect 
to the terms used, and accomplishes . . . the legislative intent, which is 
the primary object of all construction of statutes.”54  The Court remarked 
 
made only modest adjustments in the coverture law, and that these adjustments generally confirmed 
rather than confronted prevailing domestic roles of married women.”). 
 47. 218 U.S. 611 (1910). 
 48. Id. at 614. 
 49. Id. at 615-16 (setting forth the statute). The statute provided: 
Married women shall have power to engage in any business, and to contract, whether 
engaged in business or not, and to sue separately upon their contracts, and also to sue 
separately for the recovery, security, or protection of their property, and for torts 
committed against them, as fully and freely as if they were unmarried; contracts may 
also be made with them, and they may also be sued separately upon their contracts, 
whether made before or during marriage, and for wrongs independent of contract 
committed by them before or during marriage, and for wrongs independent of contract 
committed by them before or during their marriage, as fully as if they were unmarried; 
nor shall any husband be liable upon any contract made by his wife in her own name and 
upon her own responsibility, nor for any tort committed separately by her out of his 
presence without his participation or sanction: Provided, That no married woman shall 
have power to make any contract as surety or guarantor, or as accommodation drawer, 
acceptor, maker, or indorser. 
Id. (citing § 1155 of the D.C. Code, 31 Stat. 1189, 1374 (1901)). 
 50. Thompson, 218 U.S. at 615 (“In pursuance of a more liberal policy in favor of the wife, 
statutes have been passed in many of the State looking to the relief of a married woman from the 
disabilities imposed upon her as a femme covert by the common law.”). 
 51. Id. (“These statutes, passed in pursuance of the general policy of emancipation of the wife 
from the husband’s control, differ in terms and are to be construed with a view to effectuate the 
legislative purpose which led to their enactment.”). 
 52. Id. at 616. 
 53. Id. at 617. 
 54. Id. at 617-18.  However, Carl Tobias notes that “[t]he Acts’ imprecise phraseology and 
the paucity of legislative history . . . make it difficult to discern whether legislatures intended to 
alter immunity.”  Tobias, supra note 7, at 375. 
7
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that a different construction would “open the doors of the courts to 
accusations of all sorts of one spouse against the other”55 and such 
policy would dictate against its enactment.56 
This holding is arguably based on the judiciary’s own policy 
judgments and not those of the District of Columbia legislature.57  
Thompson secured the legacy of interspousal tort immunity.58  Despite 
their newly recognized property rights, this opinion left women with no 
personal legal remedy to protect themselves against domestic abuse.59 
C. Domestic Violence, Protection Orders, and Arrest Policies 
Following Thompson’s mandate, in the decades that followed the 
initial passage of the Married Women’s Property Acts, the legal system 
continued to refrain from raising the curtain on domestic violence.60  
Powerful social movements have exposed domestic violence over time, 
revealing an epidemic of domestic violence throughout the U.S.61  In 
fact, there is a high correlation between wife battering and child abuse.62  
“Between 53 – 70% of men who abuse women also beat their 
children.”63 
 
 55. Thompson, 218 U.S. at 617. 
 56. Id. at 618 (“The possible evils of such legislation might well make the lawmaking power 
hesitate to enact it”).  A closer examination of the reasoning employed by the Court in Thompson is 
set forth more fully infra notes 168-190 and accompanying text. 
 57. Tobias, supra note 7, at 387 (stating that rather than referring to legislative materials, 
courts “employed abstract canons of statutory construction and made choices premised upon their 
ideas of public policy”).  See supra note 54. 
 58. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 359 (describing the rule as prohibiting “husbands and wives 
from successfully pursuing a civil cause of action against each other for personal injuries”). 
 59. See Thompson, 218 U.S. at 619.  However, the Court stated that it provided the wife a 
“remedy for such wrongs.”  Id. (stating that “[s]he may resort to the criminal courts. . . she may sue 
for divorce or separation and for alimony. . . [s]he may resort to the chancery court for the 
protection of her separate property rights”). 
 60. Helen Rubenstein Holden, Comment, Does the Legal System Batter Women? Vindicating 
Battered Women’s Constitutional Rights to Adequate Police Protection, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 705, 709 
(1989) (“Between the late nineteenth century and the 1960’s, wife abuse was a hidden social 
problem.”). 
 61. Marion Wanless, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, But 
is it Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 536 (1996) (noting that the feminist movement of the 
1960’s was influential in changing both social and legal responses to domestic violence).  Marion 
Wanless also notes that the domestic violence “epidemic cries out for attention and a cure.”  Id. at 
533-34. 
 62. Id. at 551.  Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against Mothers Equals Violence Against 
Children: Understanding the Connections, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1995) (“[In 70%] of cases 
in which an abused child dies, there is ongoing violence against the mother.”). 
 63. Wanless, supra note 61, at 551.  See Christopher Shu-Bin Woo, Familial Violence and the 
American Criminal Justice System, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 375, 383 (1998) (“[T]here is a trend towards 
more violence and more intense violence in America’s families.”). 
8
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While the law has formally repudiated the doctrines of coverture 
and chastisement,64 the inequality and conduct underlying these 
doctrines have persisted.65  The attitudes that perpetuate the 
subordination of women inform the ways that men interact with women 
and the ways authorities respond to domestic violence, causing millions 
of women and children to suffer from abuse each year.66 
Due to the tremendous number of women and children who suffer 
from domestic violence, states have sought to provide protection through 
legislation.67  Legislatures have confronted the problem, creating legal 
remedies to help battered women protect themselves and their children.68 
Civil protection orders were created in the 1970’s, and by 1989 all 
fifty states and the District of Columbia had the protection order 
available as a civil remedy to victims of domestic violence.69  “The civil 
protection order is the primary weapon in the fight against familial 
violence.”70  Civil protection order statutes allow victims to petition 
courts for injunctive relief against their abusers.71  Civil protection 
 
 64. See, e.g., Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-47 (1871) (“[T]he privilege, ancient though 
it be, to beat her with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, 
or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law.”).  See also 
Commonwealth v. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458, 461 (1871) (“Beating or striking a wife violently with 
the open hand is not one of the rights conferred on a husband by the marriage, even if the wife be 
drunk or insolent.”). 
 65. See generally Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic 
Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801 (2001). 
 66. Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence III. New State and 
Federal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1529 (1993) [hereinafter 
Developments in the Law] (“An estimated 4 million women continue to be battered each year 
because attitudes that endorse the historical subordination of women remain embedded in both the 
male psyche and the response systems of society.”). 
 67. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 181 (2000) 
(“Legislative work has been a major aspect of feminist legal reform efforts respecting domestic 
violence”). 
 68. Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know That For Sure?: Questioning the 
Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 8-9 (2004). 
 69. Id. at 10 (identifying civil protection orders as the grandmother of domestic violence law).  
See United States v. Harrison, 461 F.2d 1209, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (recognizing that the law now 
permits disposition of intra-family offenses “through civil suits praying a civil protection order”). 
 70. Woo, supra note 63, at 392.  See Andrew R. Klein, Re-Abuse in a Population of Court-
Restrained Male Batterers: Why Restraining Orders Don’t Work, in DO ARRESTS AND 
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 192, 192 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (“[T]he 
issuance of these civil orders has become the chief means of protecting victims of domestic abuse in 
many jurisdictions.”). 
 71. Goodmark, supra note 68, at 10.  Goodmark observed that orders often prohibit 
[A]busers from continuing to assault, threaten, harass, or physically abuse victims; 
requiring that they stay from victims’ homes, places of employment, children’s schools, 
and other places frequented by the victim; precluding batters from contacting their 
victims; granting custody, visitation, child support, alimony, and other monetary relief; 
9
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orders are “vital to the family” that benefits from it, as it is a remedy that 
easily conforms to the specific needs of the beneficiary.72  In 1994, 
Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act73 requiring states to 
afford “full faith and credit” to protection orders issued in other 
jurisdictions.74  Issuing a protection order alone, however, is impotent in 
protecting women from domestic violence.75  In most cases, protection 
orders are not adequately enforced.76 
Adhering to tradition, police officers remain reluctant to interfere 
with domestic violence.77  Police attitudes and policies have contributed 
 
compelling the batterer to participate in treatment programs; and requiring that the 
abuser vacate the couple’s shared home. 
Id. 
 72. Woo, supra note 63, at 393-94. 
 73. Id. at 396.  The Act provides: 
(a) Full faith and credit.  Any protection order issued that is consistent with subsection 
(b) of this section by the court of one State or Indian tribe (the issuing State or Indian 
tribe) shall be accorded full faith and credit by the court of another state or Indian tribe 
(the enforcing State of Indian tribe) and enforced as if it were the order of the enforcing 
State or Tribe. 
(b) Protection order.  A protection order issued by a State or tribal court is consistent 
with this section if: 
(1) such court has jurisdiction over the parties and matter under the law of such State or 
Indian tribe; and 
(2) reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard is given to the person against whom 
the order is sought sufficient to protect that person’s right to due process. 
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994)).  The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) has committed 
$1.6 billion to prevent domestic violence.  Id.  The VAWA contains five titles that address violence 
against women: Title I, Safe Streets for Women (increasing sentences for repeat offenders who 
commit crimes against women); Title II, Safe Homes for Women (focusing on crimes of domestic 
violence); Title III, Civil Rights for Women (creating a civil rights remedy for violent gender-based 
discrimination); Title IV, Safe Campuses (granting funds to be spent on problems faced by women 
on college campuses); Title V, Equal Justice for Women in the Court (providing training for judges 
that addresses gender bias in courts).  Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Klein, supra note 70, at 207 (“[T]he mere issuance of [a protection order] fails to prevent 
future abuse against the same victim in almost half of the cases.”).  Studies have shown that many 
abusers that have restraining orders issued against them do not take them seriously.  Id. at 209 
(noting that such offenders are active criminals and need community-based supervision). 
 76. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: 
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 813 (1993).  See Klein, 
supra note 70, at 207 (noting that the utility of restraining orders in preventing abuse, if any, is in 
their issuance, “not in their maintenance”). 
 77. Carole Kennedy Chaney & Grace Hall Saltzstein, Democratic Control and Bureaucratic 
Responsiveness: The Police and Domestic Violence, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 745, 748 (1998) (stating 
that police departments “historically gave domestic violence a low-priority status, dismissing such 
incidents as merely order-maintenance problems or ‘social work’ rather than legitimate police 
work . . . . domestic violence as less than a ‘real’ crime . . . ‘a private matter, ill-suited to public 
intervention’”). See generally Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and 
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996). 
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to this epidemic of violence between intimate partners.78  “Police have 
responded poorly to domestic violence complaints.”79 
Police departments across the country fail to enforce civil 
protection orders.80  When police officers do respond to protection order 
violations, police officers seek only to placate the parties and tell abusive 
spouses to “take a walk around the block” to cool down.81  Police remain 
reluctant to arrest.82  This practice leaves victims unprotected and 
perpetuates the cycle of violence, giving abusers the message that their 
conduct is acceptable.83 
A famous 1984 study84 of Minneapolis police officers indicated that 
 
 78. Betsy Tsai, Note, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: 
Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1294 (2000) (quoting Eve S. 
Buzawa & Carl G Buzawa, Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response 33 (James A. 
Inciardi ed., 2d ed. 1996) (“To date, despite official policies to the contrary, many police officers 
and prosecutors still strongly believe that society should not intervene in domestic disputes except 
in cases of extraordinary violence.”).  See also Holden, supra note 60 (identifying a common belief 
among law enforcement officers that men should control their families); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 
Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that police officer’s remark he did not blame the 
plaintiff’s husband for hitting her demonstrated an intention to treat domestic abuse cases less 
seriously than other assaults, as well as animus against abused women). 
 79. Developments in the Law, supra note 66, at 1535 (“This inadequate response stems from 
beliefs that men may rightfully use force against women, from concerns about police interference in 
the private sphere of the family, from doubts that the victim will press charges, and from the lack of 
professional recognition for handling domestic cases.”).  See Chaney & Saltzstein, supra note 77, at 
748 (“[U]ntil recently, police frequently ignored domestic violence calls and, even when officers 
were dispatched, they rarely did anything about domestic violence”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 80. Klein & Orloff, supra note 76, at 813.  Theorists posit that law enforcement is afflicted 
with class and sex biases, and when “left to their own paternalistic devices, the protective services 
enforced women’s oppression like other state institutions.”  Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest of 
Batterers, A Reply to Its Critics, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 115, 119 (Eve 
S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (citing the opinions of British feminist Frances Power 
Cobbe). 
 81. Goodmark, supra note 68, at 14.  See Donaldson v. City of Seattle, 831 P.2d 1098, 1105 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (“[A] common police response to domestic violence calls was to treat the 
matter as a family quarrel, try to mediate the situation and walk the abuser around so he could ‘cool 
off.’”). 
 82. Id. (stating that the more closely related the two parties are the less likely officers are to 
arrest).  See also Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F.Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). 
 83. James Martin Truss, The Subjection of Women . . . Still: Unfulfilled Promises of 
Protection for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1149, 1190-91 (1995). 
 84. See Lawrence W. Sherman, et al., The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal Careers: 
The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 138-39, nn.7-8 
(1992) (citing Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest 
for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261 (1984) and LAWRENCE W SHERMAN & RICHARD A. 
BERK, THE MINNEAPOLIS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXPERIMENT 7 (1984)).  This empirical field 
experiment was conducted by Lawrence Sherman and Richard Berk, and it studied the deterrent 
effect of arrest on domestic violence.  Id.  While researchers have had trouble replicating the results 
of this study, see id. at 167, finding that arrest does not have a consistent deterrent effect on wife 
abusers, many commentators advocate mandatory arrest as an essential tool in stopping domestic 
11
Quester: Gonzales Court Denies Recourse
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
QUESTERFINAL.DOC 3/30/2007  1:57:08 PM 
402 AKRON LAW REVIEW [40:391 
police officers failed to arrest batterers, despite official policies that 
encouraged arrest.85  Additionally, the study found that arrest was the 
most effective deterrent to further incidents of battering.86  These 
findings led many states to conclude that the statutes underlying civil 
protection orders did not contain “sufficient civil or criminal tools to 
enforce them.”87 
D. Mandatory Arrest Policies88 
Responding to the police’s deficient performance in enforcing 
protection orders, the U.S. Attorney General issued a report 
recommending that arrests become police officers’ standard response to 
domestic assault.89  Legislatures have enacted mandatory arrest laws, 
denying police discretion when responding to domestic violence calls.90  
 
violence.  See Lerman, supra note 36. 
 85. David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal Contempt 
Sanctions to enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1171-72 (1995) (citing 
Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic 
Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261 (1984)). 
 86. Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panacea or Perpetuation of 
the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1152 (1994).  However, later studies have shown 
that the employment status of the batterer has a dramatic impact on the deterrent effect of arrest.  Id. 
at 1154. 
 87. Zlotnick, supra note 85, at 1171.  See Klein, supra note 70, at 209 (stating that state 
intervention cannot be limited to the issuance of civil restraining orders and advocating criminal 
prosecution). 
 88. Other arrest policies relating to domestic violence exist.  Welch, supra note 86, at 1148-50 
(1994).  Permissive arrest policies allow an officer to make an arrest without a warrant if he or she 
has probable cause to believe that a protection order has been violated or a crime has been 
committed.  Id. at 1149.  Police officer discretion is central to such policies.  Id.  “[P]ro-arrest or 
preferred arrest policies suggest that arrests be made in certain circumstances.”  Id. at 1150.  Police 
still have discretion to determine whether a particular case fits within those defined circumstances.  
Id. 
 89. White supra note 23, at 755 (citing U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on Family 
Violence, U.S. Dept. of Justice Final Report 10-26 (1984)). 
 90. See Neal Miller, What Does Research and Evaluation Say About Domestic Violence 
Laws? A Compendium of Justice System Laws and Related Research Assessments 91, n.270 (Dec. 
2005) (draft), available at http://www.ilj.org/publications/dv/ 
DomesticViolenceLegislationEvaluation.pdf (citing ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.530; ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-3601(B); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(a); D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-1031; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 236.12(2); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2307(b)(1); L.A. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-2140; MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (3); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.137; N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §2C:25-21; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(c); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
2935.032(A)(1)(a), 2935.03 (B)(1) (discretionary); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.055(2)(a); R.I. GEN. LAWS  
§12-29-3; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-70(B); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-3-2.1; UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-36-2.2(2); VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-81.3; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2)(c); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 968.075(2); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.085.1). 
Colorado enacted mandatory arrest legislation in 1994, strengthening restraining order laws and 
12
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These statutes mandate arrest when a police officer has probable cause 
to believe that a protection order has been violated.91 
Battered women and children have benefited from mandatory arrest 
laws.92  “Studies have shown that battered women who request police 
 
procedures for victims of domestic violence.  Article 10 of the Colorado Revised Statutes title 14, 
section 108 provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, the allocation of 
parental responsibilities, or declaration of invalidity of marriage or a proceeding for 
disposition of property, maintenance, or support following dissolution of the marriage, 
either party may move for temporary payment of debts, use of property, maintenance, 
parental responsibilities, support of a child of the marriage entitled to support, or 
payment of attorney fees. . . 
(2) As a part of a motion of such temporary orders or by an independent motion 
accompanied by an affidavit, either party may request the court to issue a temporary 
order. . . 
(b) Enjoining a party molesting or disturbing the peace of the other party or of any child 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-108 (West, Westlaw through 2006 1st Ex. Sess. of the 65th Gen. 
Assem.).  House Bill 94-1253 mandated the arrest of domestic violence perpetrators and restraining 
order violators.  Section 18-6-803.5 of the Colorado Revised Statutes provides, in pertinent part: 
(3)(a) Whenever a protection order is issued, the protected person shall be provided with 
a copy of such order.  A peace officer shall use every reasonable means to enforce a 
protection order. 
(b) A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the 
circumstances, seeks a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person. . . 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5 (West, Westlaw through 2006 1st Ex. Sess. of the 65th Gen. 
Assem.). 
 91. See Kevin Walsh, The Mandatory Arrest Law: Police Reaction, 16 PACE L. REV. 97, 97 
(1995).  An example of such a law is Washington Revised Code section 10.31.100: 
The statutory provisions applicable to this appeal read as follows: 
(2) The primary duty of peace officers, when responding to a domestic violence 
situation, is to enforce  the laws allegedly violated and to protect the complaining party. 
(3)(a) When a peace officer responds to a domestic violence call and has probable cause 
to believe that a crime has been committed, the peace officer shall exercise arrest 
powers. . . 
(2) A police officer shall arrest and take into custody . . . 
WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Legis.).  In Donaldson v. City of 
Seattle, a Washington appellate court recognized that, while a police officer generally has 
considerable discretion in determining whether to make an arrest, “in regard to domestic violence, 
the rule is the reverse.”  831 P.2d 1098, 1103 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that if the officer has 
legal grounds to arrest pursuant to the statute, he has a mandatory duty to make an arrest). 
 92. Wanless, supra note 61, at 559.  “Mandatory arrest policies have significantly increased 
the number of arrests of batterers for domestic violence crimes.”  Emily J. Sack, Battered Women 
and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 
1671 (2004).  “[I]n Washington, D.C. in 1990, prior to the passage of a mandatory arrest law, police 
arrested perpetrators in only 5% of domestic violence cases.”  Id.  “[A]fter the law took effect . . . 
police arrested perpetrators in 41% of all domestic violence calls.”  Id. at 1672.  In New York City, 
after a mandatory arrest law was enacted, “felony domestic violence arrests increased by 33%, 
misdemeanor domestic violence arrests rose 114%, and arrests for violation of protection orders 
were up 76%.”  Id.  However, mandatory arrest policies are sharply criticized.  See e.g., Stark, supra 
note 80, at 115. 
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assistance before and after the enactment of mandatory arrest laws report 
an improvement in the quality of police protection” when mandatory 
arrest laws are followed.93  However, not all mandatory arrest laws are 
successful at proscribing police officer discretion.94  When officers do 
not comply with mandatory arrest laws, the promise of protection that a 
court-issued protection order embodies becomes valueless.95 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of the Facts 
On June 22, 1999, Simon Gonzales took his three daughters from 
their mother’s home, violating a restraining order that the Castle Rock 
Police Department had issued against him.96  Their mother, Jessica 
Gonzales, upon realizing that her children were missing, suspected that 
Simon had violated the restraining order and notified the Castle Rock 
Police Department.97  During an eight hour period, Jessica Gonzales 
 
 93. Wanless, supra note 61, at 559. 
 94. Id. at 559-60.  Disputes have arisen where the mandatory arrest statute does not explicitly 
describe the scope of an officer’s duty.  In cases where the offender is absent from the scene, courts 
have not interpreted mandatory arrest statutes to require additional action to locate and arrest the 
offender.  See Donaldson, 831 P.2d. at 1104 (highlighting the problems arising from imposing upon 
police officers a mandatory duty to investigate when the offender is no longer on the scene).  See 
also Chaney & Saltzstein, supra note 77, at 749 (citing research findings that, despite mandatory 
arrest policies, police departments and officers enjoy considerable discretion in responding to 
domestic violence complaints).  It was noted: 
Departments have been able to thwart policies they disagree with by giving higher 
priority and scarce resources to other crime-control efforts; by failing to disseminate or 
enforce relevant laws and guidelines; or by omitting or downplaying such guidelines in 
training and supervising uniformed personnel; the ‘street-level’ nature of police work 
means that policy opposition among patrol officers may also thwart implementation. 
Id. 
 95. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 780 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 96. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1261 (10th Cir. 2002), aff’d on reh’g, 
366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).  The restraining order was issued on 
May 21, 1999, for the benefit of Jessica Gonzales, Simon Gonzales’ ex-wife.  Id.  Simon Gonzales 
was troubled, having a history of suicide threats and erratic behavior.  Id. The restraining order was 
issued pursuant to section 14-10-108 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, under which a party to 
proceedings for the dissolution of marriage may obtain a temporary order “[e]njoining a party from 
molesting or disturbing the peace of the other party or of any child.”  See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
14-10-108 (West, Westlaw through 2006 1st Ex. Sess. of the 65th Gen. Assem.).  The restraining 
order was made permanent on June 4, 1999.  Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1261.  The order granted Mr. 
Gonzales very limited visitation with his children; he was allowed to visit them on weekends and 
for two weeks during the summer and he could visit during the week with Jessica Gonzales’ 
approval.  Id. 
 97. Id.  At 7:30 p.m., two officers were dispatched to her home.  Id.  She showed the officers 
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repeatedly asked the police to enforce the restraining order and locate 
her children, yet the Castle Rock Police Department never took any 
action against Simon Gonzales.98  At 3:20 a.m., Simon Gonzales arrived 
at the Castle Rock Police Station and opened fire with a semi-automatic 
handgun.99  The police found Jessica Gonzales’ three daughters outside, 
in the cab of Simon Gonzales’ truck.100  He had murdered the girls 
earlier that evening.101 
B. Procedural History 
Jessica Gonzales brought suit against the city of Castle Rock in the 
District Court of Colorado, claiming that the city violated her 14th 
Amendment102 due process rights in failing to enforce the restraining 
order.103  The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, 
 
a copy of the order but the officers “stated that there was nothing they could do about the order” and 
told her to call again if the children were not home by 10 p.m.  Id. 
 98. Id.  Even after Simon Gonzales had called Jessica Gonzales, confirming her suspicions 
and disclosing his whereabouts, the police refused to take any action.  Id.  At 10 p.m., Jessica 
Gonzales called the police department, as instructed, but the officers still refused to take action and 
told her to wait until midnight to call again.  Id.  Jessica Gonzales called the police at midnight, 
informing them that her children were still missing, but they refused to take action.  Id.  At 
midnight, she called the police department again from Simon Gonzales’ apartment complex and 
they told her to wait there until police arrived.  Id.  The police never met Jessica Gonzales; she went 
to the police station at 12:50 p.m., but the officer she met with still refused to enforce the restraining 
order.  Id. 
 99. Id. at 1262.  Simon Gonzales was shot and killed on the scene.  Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 103. Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1260.  Jessica Gonzales had brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 (1999).  Id.  In addition to the City of Castle Rock, she named Castle Rock police officers 
Aaron Ahlfinger, R.S. Brink, and Marc Ruisi as defendants.  Id.  To succeed in a § 1983 claim, a 
plaintiff must show that she was deprived of a constitutional right by a person acting under color of 
state law.  Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1098 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 545 U.S. 
748 (2005).  Plaintiff alleged that the statute that conferred the temporary restraining order created a 
property right under the 14th Amendment, which thereby imposed upon the police officers a 
constitutional duty to enforce the restraining order.  Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, No. 00-D-
1285, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26018, at*4 (D. Colo. 2001), rev’d, 307 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2002), 
aff’d on reh’g, 366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).  Plaintiff alleged that 
§ 18-6-803.5(3) of the Colorado Revised Statutes required defendants to take action against Simon 
Gonzales.  Id.  Section 18-6-803.5 (3) provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Whenever a protection order is issued, the protected person shall be provided with a 
copy of such order.  A peace officer shall use every reasonable means to enforce a 
protection order. 
(b) A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the 
circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person when the peace 
officer has information amounting to probable cause that: 
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finding that Jessica Gonzales had failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted.104 
On appeal, a panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court’s dismissal of Jessica Gonzales’ substantive due 
process claim, but found that she had successfully alleged a procedural 
due process claim.105  The court analyzed the Colorado statute that set 
forth the conditions under which the state would enforce the temporary 
restraining order to determine whether it conferred an entitlement 
“which would enjoy due process protection against state deprivation.”106  
After examining the Colorado statute’s explicit language, its prior 
 
(I) The restrained person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of a 
protection order; and 
(II) The restrained person has been properly served with a copy of the protection order or 
the restrained person has received actual notice of the existence and substance of such an 
order. 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5 (3) (1999) (emphasis added). 
 104. Gonzales, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26018, at *1-14.  The district court stated that “[e]ven 
when there is a protectable property interest, the Due Process Clause does not generally confer an 
‘affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, 
or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.’”  Gonzales, 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26018, at *7 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)).  In 
determining whether plaintiff had a property interest entitled to procedural due process protection, 
the court looked to state law to determine whether existing rules had created for plaintiff a 
legitimate claim of entitlement in the temporary restraining order.  Gonzales, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26018, at *7.  The court stated that COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3) would allow plaintiff 
to have a legitimate claim of entitlement to enforcement of the restraining order if the “regulatory 
language is so mandatory that it creates a right to rely on that language.”  Id. at *13. (quoting Cosco 
v. Uphoff, 195 F.3d 1221, 1223 (10th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).  Jessica Gonzales cited case law in 
support of her claim that found both procedural due process rights and substantive due process 
rights in the enforcement of restraining orders.  Id. at *13 n. 3; See also Siddle v. City of 
Cambridge, 761 F. Supp. 503, 509 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (concluding that a protective order obtained 
pursuant to state law creates a property right); Coffman v. Wilson Police Dep’t, 739 F. Supp. 257, 
264 (E.D. Pa 1990) (concluding that mandatory language contained in a restraining order created a 
property interest in police enforcement).  However, the district court was not compelled by the 
reasoning of those courts.  Gonzales, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26018, at *9. Instead, the district court 
found that even though the statute includes mandatory language, it was not truly mandatory as an 
arrest is premised on probable cause and the process by which officers determine whether probable 
cause exists requires that police officers exercise discretion.  Id. at *11. 
 105. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1261 (10th Cir. 2002), aff’d on reh’g, 
366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
 106. Id. at 1264.  In determining whether the Colorado statute at issue conferred an entitlement 
that enjoys due process protection, the panel followed the guidelines the Supreme Court set forth in 
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).  Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1264.  The 
panel stated that when “a plaintiff contends that a constitutionally protected property interest is 
created by a state statute, we have held that such an interest arises when ‘the regulatory language is 
so mandatory that it creates a right to rely on that language thereby creating an entitlement that 
could not be withdrawn without due process.’”  Id. (quoting Cosco, 195 F.3d at 1223 (10th Cir. 
1999)).  The panel found that the statute included mandatory language.  Gonzales, 307 F.3d. at 
1265. 
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judicial interpretations,107 and its legislative history,108 the court found 
that the statute created a protected property interest falling under the Due 
Process Clause.109 
On rehearing en banc, the Tenth Circuit followed its panel decision 
and reversed the district court’s dismissal of Jessica Gonzales’ 
procedural due process claim.110  The court stressed that it was both the 
court-issued restraining order and the Colorado statute that established 
the basis for Jessica Gonzales’ procedural due process claim, as both 
“specifically dictated that [the order’s] terms must be enforced.”111 
As mandatory language was included in both the restraining order 
itself and the statute which dictated the terms of its enforcement, it was 
the clear intent of the Colorado legislature to grant Jessica Gonzales 
entitlement to its enforcement.112  The court found that, while situations 
may require police discretion, the recipient of a court-ordered restraining 
order is still entitled to “a reasoned police response or reasonable 
protection.”113  Jessica Gonzales should have been afforded some form 
of process prior to [the police’s] non-enforcement of the restraining 
order.114 
 
 107. The panel noted that the “Colorado courts have stated unambiguously that in Colorado 
statutes, ‘shall’ does in fact mean ‘shall.’”  Id. at 1265.  See People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 975 
(Colo. 1994 ) (“The word ‘shall,’ when used in a statute, involves a ‘mandatory connotation’ and 
hence is the antithesis of discretion or choice.” ). 
 108. The panel concluded that the legislative history of the statute “clearly indicates that the 
legislature intended to impose a mandatory obligation on the police as well as on other involved in 
the criminal justice system who deal with domestic abuse.”  Gonzales, 307 F.3d at 1265. 
 109. Id. at 1266. 
 110. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1096.  The court also held that the individual police officers named 
in plaintiff’s complaint were entitled to qualified immunity.  Id.  The en banc court was not asked to 
address Ms. Gonzales’ substantive due process claim.  See id. 
 111. Id. at 1101 n.5.  Jessica Gonzales’ property interest attached when the state court judge 
issued the restraining order.  Id. at 1103.  The court also stated that Colorado Revised Statutes 
section 18-6-803.5(3) derived its force “from the existence of a restraining order issued by a court 
on behalf of a particular person and directed at specific individuals and the police.”  Id. at 1104 n.9. 
 112. Id.  After citing legislative history, related statutes (see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-
803.6(b)) and related commentary, the court stated that “[t]he Colorado legislature clearly wanted to 
alter the fact that the police were not enforcing domestic abuse restraining orders.”  Id. at 1108. 
 113. Id. at 1107. 
 114. Id. at 1111-12.  In making this ruling, the court rejected defendants’ argument that “there 
is no practical pre-deprivation process under § 18-6-803.5(3) . . . which can be afforded to the 
holder of a restraining order.  The only conceivable scenario would be to require law 
enforcement . . . to entertain a later hearing.”  Id. 
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C. United States Supreme Court Decision 
1. Majority Opinion115 
In deciding the certified issue,116 the Court refused to defer to the 
determinations made by the federal courts presiding over Colorado as to 
Colorado law.117  First the Court asked whether the Colorado statute at 
issue made police action mandatory;118 second, the Court examined 
whether Jessica Gonzales was entitled to enforcement of the restraining 
order;119 third, the Court analyzed whether an interest in a temporary 
restraining order could be property within the meaning of the due 
process clause.120  The Court answered each of these inquiries in the 
negative.121 
The Court found that, even though the statute appears to make 
enforcement of the temporary restraining order mandatory, the statute 
did not make such enforcement truly mandatory.122 Central to this 
determination was the Court’s perception that “[a] well established 
tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently 
mandatory arrest statutes.”123  The Court stated that the Colorado 
Legislature would have to take extra steps to make police action 
mandatory.124  The Court aligned the Colorado statute at issue here with 
arrest statutes that include seemingly mandatory language but are not 
 
 115. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 750 (2005).  Justice Scalia delivered the 
opinion of the Court, in which Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer 
joined. 
 116. The certified issue was “whether an individual who has obtained a state-law restraining 
order has a constitutionally protected property interest in having the police enforce the restraining 
order when they have probable cause to believe it has been violated.” Id. at 750-51. 
 117. Id. at 757-58.  While the Court recognized that it usually gives deference to the views of a 
federal court as to the law of a State within its jurisdiction, it regarded deference to the Tenth Circuit 
as inappropriate.  Id. (stating that the Tenth Circuit did not draw upon a “deep well of state-specific 
expertise” in its opinion despite having cited case-law and having quoted language from the 
restraining order, statute, and a state legislative hearing transcript). 
 118. Id. at 760-64. 
 119. Id. at 764-66. 
 120. Id. at 766-68. 
 121. Responding to the Tenth Circuit’s observation that a domestic abuse restraining order 
would be valueless if its beneficiary were not entitled to its enforcement, the Court stated, “[t]he 
creation of grounds on which [Simon Gonzales] could be arrested, criminally prosecuted, and held 
in contempt was hardly ‘valueless’ . . .”  Id. at 760. 
 122. Id. at 761. 
 123. Id. at 760. 
 124. Id. at 761 (“[A] true mandate of police action would require some stronger indication 
from the Colorado Legislature than ‘shall use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order’ 
or even ‘shall arrest . . . or . . . seek a warrant.’”). 
18
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carried out as such.125  The Court observed that such action cannot truly 
be mandatory when officers must take the circumstances of the violation 
into account before acting.126 
The Court did recognize that mandatory-arrest statutes relating to 
domestic violence are more mandatory than traditional mandatory arrest 
statutes in some states.127  However, the Court opined that such arrests 
are mandatory only when the offender is present at the scene.128 
Next, the Court stated that even if the domestic-violence context 
underlying the statute mandated enforcement of the restraining order, it 
did not automatically follow that state law gave Jessica Gonzales an 
entitlement to the enforcement of the restraining order.129  If the 
Colorado legislature had obligated police officers to take action, such an 
obligation would purport to “serve public ends rather than private 
ends.”130  The statutory scheme from which Jessica Gonzales derived her 
interest did not specifically identify “protected persons” entitled to 
enforcement of the statute.131 
The Court stated that even if Colorado law had conferred upon 
Jessica Gonzales a personal entitlement to enforcement of the restraining 
order, the Court would probably not recognize it as a property interest 
under the Due Process Clause.132  As a temporary restraining order has 
 
 125. Id. at 761-62. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 762.  The Court also acknowledged the similar language used in the Colorado 
statute mandating arrest for a domestic-violence offense.  Id.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-
803.6(1) (1999) (“When a peace officer determines that there is probable cause to believe that a 
crime or offense involving domestic violence . . . has been committed, the officer shall, without 
undue delay, arrest the person suspected of its commission . . . .”). 
 128. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 762 (questioning how mandatory arrest statutes in the domestic 
violence context operate when the offender is not present to be arrested, stating “much of the 
impetus for mandatory-arrest statutes and policies derived from the idea that it is better for police 
officers to arrest the aggressor in a domestic-violence incident than to attempt to mediate the dispute 
or merely ask the offender to leave the scene”).  Bolstering this argument, the Court cited the 
provision of the Colorado statute that provides “when an arrest is impractical, the officer shall seek 
a warrant.”  Id. at 763 (citing COLO. REV. STAT § 18-6-803.5(3)(b)).  Additionally, as Jessica 
Gonzales did not point to a specific means of enforcement provided by the statute, it could not be 
mandatory.  Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 763 (stating that indeterminacy is not the hallmark of a duty 
that is mandatory and that a person can not be entitled to something when the identity of the alleged 
entitlement is vague). 
 129. Id. at 764-65. 
 130. Id. at 765.  See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) (finding no 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in prison regulations phrased in mandatory terms, in part 
because “such guidelines are not set forth solely to benefit the prisoner”). 
 131. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 765-66. 
 132. Id. at 766-68.  See also Scott Lewis, Failure to Enforce Restraining Order Does Not State 
a Constitutional Claim, WIS. L.J., July 6, 2005, available at http://www.wislawjournal.com/archive/ 
2005/0706/lewis-0706.html (interpreting the Court’s opinion to mean that “the ‘benefit’ conferred 
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no ascertainable monetary value, the Court found that it does not 
“resemble any traditional conception of property.”133 
2. Concurring Opinion134 
Justices Souter and Breyer agreed that police enforcement has a 
public focus and police discretion is inherent in giving effect to a 
restraining order.135 Accordingly, these considerations “argue against 
inferring any guarantee of a level of protection or safety that could be 
understood as the object of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement,’ in the 
nature of property arising under Colorado law.”136  As Jessica Gonzales 
was claiming a benefit in “a variety of procedural regulation” and not a 
substantive interest, she was not entitled to the procedural protection 
afforded by the Due Process Clause.137 
3. Dissenting Opinion138 
The dissent noted that federal law did not preclude the state of 
Colorado from creating individual entitlement to police protection.139  
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg stated that if a Colorado statute or a valid 
order entered by a Colorado judge granted an individual such as Jessica 
Gonzales an entitlement to mandatory police protection, then such a law 
or order would create the functional equivalent of a contract for 
protective services as that which would exist between private parties.140  
 
by enforcement was an indirect or incidental benefit flowing from the traditionally discretionary 
decision to arrest or not arrest based upon probable cause”). 
 133. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 766.  The Court also stated that “the alleged property interest 
here arises incidentally . . . out of a function that government actors have always performed—to wit, 
arresting people who they have probable cause to believe have committed a criminal offense.” Id. at 
766-67 (emphasis in original).  See O’Bannon v. Town Ct. Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 775 (1980) 
(holding that indirect benefits conferred upon Medicaid patients when the government enforced 
minimum standards of care for nursing-home facilities did not trigger due process protections).  The 
Court indicated that it did not want to extend due process protection to something “as vague and 
novel as enforcement of restraining orders.”  Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 766. 
 134. Id. at 769 (Souter, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer joined Justice Souter’s concurring 
opinion.  Id. 
 135. Id. at 769-70. 
 136. Id. at 770 (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). 
 137. Id. at 770-71 (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983), and noting that 
process is not an end in itself).  Therefore, finding no “distinction between the object of [her] 
asserted entitlement and the process she desires in order to protect her entitlement,” the concurrence 
was not willing to substitute federal process for state process.  Id. at 772. 
 138. Id. at 773 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens’ dissenting 
opinion.  Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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The dissent criticized the majority’s refusal to “defer to the judgment of 
more qualified tribunals in seeking the correct answer to [a] difficult 
question of Colorado law.”141 
The dissent squarely disagreed with the three determinations made 
by the majority.142  First, the majority did not fully account for the 
“unique case of ‘mandatory arrest’ statutes in the domestic violence 
context.”143  Under the statute, the police lacked the discretion to do 
nothing.144  Second, the majority failed to recognize that the Colorado 
statute at issue was enacted for the benefit of “the narrow class of 
persons” and the order at issue “was specifically intended to provide 
protection to [Jessica Gonzales] and her children.”145  Finally, the dissent 
criticized the majority for finding that police enforcement in these 
circumstances was not “property” within the meaning of the due process 
clause.146 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Refusing to Remove an Obstacle to the Remedy 
In Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the majority passed up an opportunity 
to end the executive branch’s resistance to enforcing protection 
orders.147  Instead, it rendered civil protection orders meaningless in the 
 
 141. Id. at 775. 
 142. Id. at 779. 
 143. Id. at 779-80 (noting that, in enacting the statute at issue, the Colorado General Assembly 
joined a nationwide movement of States that took aim at the crisis of police under-enforcement in 
the domestic violence sphere by implementing mandatory arrest statutes).  The dissent stated, 
“[W]hen Colorado passed its statute in 1994, it joined the ranks of 15 States that mandated arrest for 
domestic violence offenses and 19 States that mandated arrest for domestic restraining order 
violations.”  Id. at 781. 
 144. Id. at 783. 
 145. Id.at 779. 
 146. Id. (“[A] citizen’s property interest in such a commitment is just as concrete and worthy 
of protection as her interest in any other important service the government or a private firm has 
undertaken to provide.”). 
 147. See Sarah M. Buel, For Battered Women, a Chilling Court Ruling, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, July 15, 2005, at A15 (observing that the Castle Rock Court sent the message to 
domestic violence victims that their calls to the police for help might not be answered).  Buel 
insightfully states: 
Four battered women are killed every day in the United States . . . . [i]f foreign terrorists 
were killing four Americans per day, it’s likely that the F-16s would be fired up and 
troops readied.  But apparently if the terrorist is a current or former partner, the Supreme 
Court warrants discretionary assistance. 
Id. 
21
Quester: Gonzales Court Denies Recourse
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
QUESTERFINAL.DOC 3/30/2007  1:57:08 PM 
412 AKRON LAW REVIEW [40:391 
context of domestic violence.148  Jessica Gonzales sought review of 
Castle Rock Police Department’s official policies and practices 
regarding its enforcement of protection orders to determine if the state 
had a procedure that destroyed entitlement without employing proper 
procedural safeguards.149  Jessica Gonzales did not claim that the Due 
Process Clause itself required the Castle Rock Police Department to 
protect her and her children against harm from her ex-husband.150  
Instead, she argued that procedural due process protection attached to 
her court-issued protection order, which prevented her interest from 
being evaporated by police officer inaction.151  Unfortunately, the Court 
quickly dismissed the significance of the arrest mandates that had been 
printed on the protection order itself152 and focused its inquiry on 
 
 148. See Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1109 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 545 
U.S. 748 (2005) (stating that in light of the mandatory statute, its legislative history, and the 
legislative scheme’s grant of immunity to officers who erroneously enforce protection orders any 
other conclusion would “render domestic abuse restraining orders utterly valueless”).  Contra Town 
of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760 (stating that any characterization of restraining 
orders as “valueless” is “sheer hyperbole”).  The Court thought that it was enough that the 
restraining order made otherwise lawful conduct by Simon Gonzales unlawful, “[w]hether or not 
respondent had a right to enforce the restraining order.”  Id.  “The creation of grounds on which he 
could be arrested, criminally prosecuted, and held in contempt was hardly ‘valueless’ – even if the 
prospect of those sanctions ultimately failed to prevent him from committing three murders and a 
suicide.”  Id. 
 149. Compare Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982) (emphasizing that, 
in that case, it was the “state system itself that destroys a complainant’s property interest, by 
operation of law, whenever the Commission fails to convene a timely conference”). 
 150. Such a claim would have failed under the Court’s holding in DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).  In that case, “local child-
protection officials had failed to protect a young boy from beatings by his father that left him 
severely brain damaged.”  Id. at 191-193.  The Castle Rock Court stated that DeShaney held that 
“the so-called ‘substantive’ component of the Due Process Clause does not ‘requir[e] the State to 
protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.’” Castle Rock, 
545 U.S. at 755 (quoting Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 195). 
 151. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due process imposes 
constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests 
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 152. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 758 (2005) (recognizing that the critical language did not come 
from any part of the order itself but “from the preprinted notice to law-enforcement personnel that 
appeared on the back of the order”).  But see City of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 366 F.3d 1093, 1096 
(10th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (observing that the restraining order stated that “the 
court . . . finds that physical or emotional harm would result if you are not excluded from the family 
home”).  “The order also contained explicit terms directing law enforcement officials that they 
‘shall use every reasonable means to enforce’ the restraining order, they ‘shall arrest’ or where 
impractical, seek an arrest warrant for those who violate the restraining order, and they ‘shall take 
the restrained person to the nearest jail or detention facility.’”  Id. at 1097.  It was erroneous for the 
Court to conclude that since the critical language did not appear on the same side of the restraining 
order as that signed by the state-court trial judge it was not part of the order at all.  See Castle Rock, 
545 U.S. at 758.  Additionally, the Court noted that the order was directed to the restrained party.  
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whether Jessica Gonzales had a protected entitlement to enforcement of 
the underlying mandatory arrest statute.153  The Court substituted its 
policy judgments for those of the legislature, emphasizing that 
traditional police discretion softens statutes that appear to mandate 
arrest, and thereby found the statute at issue not truly mandatory.154 
Due process is flexible and the type of procedural protection it 
provides depends on the nature of the property right that the government 
seeks to infringe upon.155  Had the Court recognized Jessica Gonzales’ 
property interest in her protection order, it would have had to balance the 
governmental and private interests affected by the government’s 
(in)action.156  Additionally, the Court would have been required to 
consider the degree of potential deprivation that could arise from the 
government’s (in)action.157  Faced with this analysis, the Court would 
have found it difficult to reach the result that it sought to achieve.158 
 
Id.  The town of Castle Rock argued this point in oral argument.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, 
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278) (“In order to take a statute and 
try and find a property interest, we would want to have it phrased in terms of the beneficiary rather 
than the person restrained . . . . [n]one of that is here.”). 
 153. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 758 (stating that the pre-printed notice to law-enforcement 
personnel merely “restated the statutory provision describing ‘peace officers’ duties’ related to the 
crime of violation of a restraining order”).  This shift in focus made it easier for the Court to 
disregard Jessica Gonzales’ interest in the protection order.  See also Brief for the Petitioner at 23, 
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278) (stating that the fact that the 
statute was coupled with a restraining order in this case is “largely a distinction without a 
difference”). 
 154. See Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 760.  See also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 153, at 13 
(arguing that the statute, when read against the backdrop of the traditional discretion afforded to law 
enforcement, “is merely directory, not mandatory”). 
 155. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (noting that due process is not a technical conception with fixed 
content but is related to time, place and circumstances). 
 156. Id.  Three factors must be considered in determining what process is due: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
Id. at 335.  The Supreme Court has distinguished between government acts and government failures 
to act; when the former causes harm it is actionable, but when the latter occurs, it is not actionable.  
See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Negative Constitution: The Duty to Protect, HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
Sept. 1, 2005, at 10.  However, the difference between the two is often difficult to determine, as 
“[a]ny government failure to act is usually embedded in a series of affirmative policy choices.”  Id. 
 157. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341. 
 158. See, e.g. Buel, supra note 147 (criticizing the Castle Rock Court’s majority for its 
“intellectually dishonest approach of pretending to locate legal justification when protection of 
municipal coffers would seem to be the guiding force”).  Justice Breyer conveyed this concern 
during oral argument, stating: “Suppose shall does mean shall . . . . [b]ut you might have a statute 
that says the fire department shall respond to fires, the police department shall respond to crimes, 
the Army shall respond to attacks.”  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 152, at 8. 
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The Castle Rock Police Department did not take any action to 
enforce Jessica Gonzales’ protection order.159  “Their response, in other 
words, was a sham which rendered her property interest in the 
restraining order not only a nullity, but a cruel deception.”160  This 
practice demonstrated extreme disregard of the significance of a court 
order.161  In the face of the potential violence and injury that was likely 
to result in the absence of its enforcement, the Castle Rock Police 
Department clearly violated the Due Process Clause.162 
The Court avoided this inquiry by finding that a protection order is 
not “property” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.163  
However, in order to make this finding, the Court ignored the clear 
intent of the Colorado legislature and nationwide legislative efforts to 
combat domestic violence through mandatory arrest laws.164  
Additionally, the Court ignored the significance of the court-issued 
protection order.165  In order to preserve the tradition of police 
discretion,166 the Court deviated from Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 159. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1117 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 545 U.S. 
748 (2005) (“[T]he police never ‘heard’ nor seriously entertained her request to enforce and protect 
her interests in the restraining order . . . . If one considers that the process to which she was entitled 
was a bona fide consideration by the police of a request to enforce a restraining order, she was 
denied that process as well.”). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id.  See also G. Kristian Miccio, What Does “Shall” Mean?, DENVER POST, July 17, 
2005, at E3 (“Colorado took away any discretion from police because of overwhelming evidence 
that police refused to arrest boyfriends and husbands when these men assaulted their girlfriends or 
wives.”); Sarah M. Buel, If Courts and Police Refuse to Protect Us, Where Will we Turn?, KANSAS 
CITY STAR, July 10, 2005, at B7 ( “How . . . can we sanction the Castle Rock officer who, on 
Gonzales’ sixth plea for help, still refused to investigate?  Instead, he went to dinner.”). 
 162. Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1115 (“Ms. Gonzales’ repeated phone calls to the police department 
and the officers’ seemingly outright dismissal of her claims” did not constitute “the opportunity to 
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”).  See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 
455 U.S. 422, 434-35 (1982) (“A system or procedure that deprives persons of their claims in a 
random manner . . . necessarily presents an unjustifiably high risk that meritorious claims will be 
terminated.”). 
 163. See Lewis, supra note 132 (stating that the Court “would not address the liability of Castle 
Rock based on its alleged ‘custom or policy’ of non-enforcement because no constitutional violation 
existed”). 
 164. See Christopher J. Roederer, The Constitutionally Inspired Approaches to Police 
Accountability for Violence Against Women in the U.S. and South Africa: Conservation Versus 
Transformation, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 91, 94-95 (2005). 
 165. See Christopher J. Roederer, Another Case in Lochner’s Legacy, the Court’s Assault on 
New Property: The Right to the Mandatory Enforcement of a Restraining Order is a “Sham,” 
“Nullity,” and “Cruel Deception.,” 54 DRAKE L. REV. 321, 333 (2006) (“The Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals found that the statute’s force was derived from the restraining order that was ‘issued by a 
court on behalf of a particular person and directed at specific individuals and the police.’”). 
 166. See Michael Mattis, Note, Protection Orders: A Procedural Pacifier or a Vigorously 
Enforced Protection Tool? A Discussion of the Tenth Circuit’s Decision in Gonzales v. Castle Rock, 
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jurisprudence and rendered thoroughly developed domestic violence 
legislation meaningless.167 
B. Old Tools in a New Box? 
The Court’s approach to interpreting the statute in Castle Rock 
appears reminiscent of that employed in Thompson and other opinions 
that interpreted provisions of the Married Women’s Property Acts.168  
By passing legislation associated with the Married Women’s Property 
Acts, Congress and state legislatures began to pass statutes to relieve 
women of the disabilities imposed upon them by coverture and to 
emancipate them from their husbands.169  These statutes purported to 
 
82 DENV. U.L. REV. 519, 534 (2005).  In his dissent, Judge Kelly of the Tenth Circuit noted: 
Enormous economic consequences could follow from the reading of the fourteenth 
amendment that plaintiff here urges.  Firemen who have been alerted to a victim’s peril 
but fail to take effective action; municipal ambulances which, when called, arrive late; 
and myriad other errors by state officials in providing protective services, could all be 
found to violate the Constitution. 
Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1119 n.2 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 545 U.S. 748 
(2005) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (quoting Estate of Gilmore, 787 F2d 714, 722-3 (1st Cir. 1986)).  See 
also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 153, at 12-13 (“[T]his Court should be wary of ever 
recognizing a non-traditional Roth-type property interest in police enforcement procedures, 
infringement of which would depend on the substantive result to establish a prima facie claim of 
procedural failure every time the police were unsuccessful in protecting against private-party 
violence.”). 
 167. Roederer, supra note 164, at 118. 
 168. See Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1865).  In Freethy, the New York 
Supreme Court considered whether “section 3 of chapter 172 of the Laws of 1862,” which provided 
that “any married woman may bring and maintain an action in her own name, for damages, against 
any person . . . for any injury to her person or character, the same as if she were sole,” permitted a 
wife to bring a tort suit against her husband.  Id.  The court considered: 
It is true that the words “any person” are very comprehensive, and might in a proper case 
be held to include a husband; but the question is, whether, in view of all that the act 
contains, and of all the surrounding circumstances, we can infer that the legislature 
intended that a wife might bring such an action.  If the words used necessarily included 
the husband, we should not be at liberty to say that they were inoperative; but they do 
not; and it is our duty to ascertain, if we can, whether the legislature meant to include 
suits against him. 
Id.  The court held that it did not, after considering the following rules of statutory construction: 
In all doubtful matters, and when the expression is in general terms, statutes are to 
receive such a construction as may be agreeable to the rules of the common law, in cases 
of that nature; for statutes are not presumed to make any alteration of the common law, 
further or otherwise than the act expressly declares; therefore, in all general matters, the 
law presumes the act did not intend to make any alteration; for if the parliament had that 
design, they should have expressed it in the act. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 169. See Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 615 (1910).  In Schultz v. Schultz, the 
Supreme Court of New York departed from precedent and held that the Married Women’s Property 
Acts did afford women the right to sue their husbands in tort, stating: 
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give women the right to control and dispose of their own property, to sue 
for trespass upon their rights in property, and to sue others for assaults 
committed against them.170 
However, courts undercut the liberating effect these laws would 
have on women’s lives.171  Judges “mobilized language and interpretive 
tools that permitted them to continue to apply received common law 
orthodoxy and ignore transformative visions apparent in the new 
legislation,”172 while still claiming to construe them “with a view to 
effectuate the legislative purpose which led to their enactment.”173  
Courts viewed the legislation associated with the Married Women’s 
Property Acts as “statutes in derogation of the common law,” and when 
presented with a hint of ambiguity in legislative intent, courts interpreted 
them strictly and narrowly.174  The Supreme Court instructed courts to 
construe these statutes “hav[ing] in mind the old law and the change 
intended to be effected by the passage of the new.”175  Unfortunately, 
 
But without pursuing this subject further, it is considered quite sufficient to say that the 
language of the statute is, as conceded by some of the learned judges to whose opinions 
reference has been made, quite comprehensive enough to include the husband as one of 
the persons against whom the wife may bring an action for an assault and battery, and 
who has been relieved from liability under the language of the statute only by judicial 
resort to what is declared to have been the right in an action of this character, in 
accordance with the language of the statute, would be to promote greater harmony by 
enlarging the rights of married women and increasing the obligations of husbands by 
affording greater protection to the former, and by enforcing greater restraint upon the 
latter in the indulgence of their evil passions.  The declaration of such a rule is not 
against the policy of the law.  It is in harmony with it, and calculated to preserve peace, 
and in a great measure prevent barbarous acts, acts of cruelty regarded by mankind as 
inexcusable, contemptible, detestable. 
It is neither too early nor too late to promulgate the doctrine that if a husband commits an 
assault and battery upon his wife he may be held responsible civilly and criminally for 
the act, which is not only committed in violation of the laws of God and man, but in 
direct antagonism to the contract of marriage, its obligations, duties, responsibilities and 
the very basis on which it rests. 
63 How. Pr. 181 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1882). 
 170. Thompson, 218 U.S. at 615.  See e.g. § 1155 of the District of Columbia Code, 31 Stat. 
1189, 1374 (1901), supra note 49. 
 171. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 290-91 (2000). 
 172. Id. at 291. 
 173. Thompson, 218 U.S. at 615. 
 174. See Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908) (“[C]ourts have been 
disinclined to extend statutes modifying the common law beyond the direct operation of the words 
used, and that at times this disinclination has been carried very far.”).  In Man and Wife in America: 
A History, Hendrik Hartog explains that “the most important such judicial tool was the interpretive 
standard that ‘statutes in derogation of the common law,’ which is what all those statutes were, 
ought to be interpreted strictly and narrowly, against any expansive meaning.” HARTOG, supra note 
171, at 291. 
 175. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611. 
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this translated into maintaining certain inequities of the old status regime 
under the guise of revolutionary social change.176 
Thus, while recognizing that the legislature sought to free women 
from the complete control of their husbands, the Court immediately 
circumscribed the rights conferred by those statutes.177  Sometimes the 
courts rejected the explicit language of the statute and rendered statutes 
impotent.178  Courts substituted their own policy judgments for those of 
the legislature, refusing to give statutes their logical meanings unless 
legislatures used explicit language to change the common law.179  Courts 
 
 176. See Chused, supra note 46, at 1361 (“[T]he early married women’s acts made only 
modest adjustments in coverture law and that these adjustments generally confirmed prevailing 
domestic roles of married women.”).  See also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer 
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997).  
Siegel observes that while legislatures have attempted to abolish certain unequal status 
relationships, courts often resist significant changes in the law; thus, courts maintain the old law 
while giving it modern justification.  Id. at 1118-19.  The justification adopted by the legal system 
to maintain status relationships “evolve as they are contested.”  Id. at 1114. 
 177. See infra notes 178-90 and accompanying text. 
 178. HARTOG, supra note 171, at 291.  See, e.g., Cole v. Van Riper, 44 Ill. 58, 1867 WL 5096 
(1867) (addressing the question of whether the Married Women’s Property Act allowed a married 
woman to convey real estate without the joinder of her husband).  The Married Women’s Property 
Act at issue in Cole v. Van Riper, provided: 
[A]ll the property, both real and personal, belonging to any married woman, as her sole 
and separate property, or which any woman hereafter married owns at the time of her 
marriage, or which any married woman, during coverture acquires in good faith from 
any person other than her husband, by descent, devise or otherwise, together with all the 
rents, issues, increase, and profits thereof, shall, notwithstanding the marriage, be and 
remain during coverture, her sole and separate property under he sole control, and be 
held, owned possessed and enjoyed by her the same as though she was sole and 
unmarried; and shall not be subject to the disposal, control or interference of her 
husband, and shall be exempt from execution or attachment for the debts of her 
husband.” 
Id. at *3.  The court noted that the legislature “used very sweeping language, but it must be 
interpreted with reference to the evil intended to be cured, and in such manner as to be made to 
harmonize with other statutes which are left unrepealed, so far as such harmony can be secured 
without disregarding the legislative intent.”  Id. at *4 (stating that “repeal by implication is never 
favored”).  The court would not apply the plain language of the statute, stating that the “statute 
cannot be enforced according to its literal terms without impairing, to a very large extent, the 
strength of the marriage tie.”  Id.  The Court reasoned: 
[T]he object of the legislature was, not to loosen the bonds of matrimony, or create an 
element of constant strife between husband and wife, but to protect the latter against the 
misfortunes, imprudence, or possible vice of the former, by enabling her to withhold her 
property from being levied upon and sold for the payment of his debts or squandered by 
him against her wishes.” 
Id. 
 179. HARTOG, supra note 171, at 291 ( “The judges who mobilized the standard worried about 
disturbances to ‘family solidarity;’ they remained committed to the subordination of wives; and they 
often understood the statutes as unjustified redistributions of rights and powers from husbands to 
wives”). 
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refused to give such statutes a “literal interpretation” because to do so 
would impair “to a very large extent, the strength of the marriage tie.”180  
Courts feared the far-reaching policy implications that such an 
interpretation could have on a husband’s authority.181 
In Thompson v. Thompson,182 the Court recognized that the 
legislature conferred upon women new rights; however, the court stated 
that “[t]he statute was not intended to give a right of action as against the 
husband, but to allow the wife, in her own name, to maintain actions of 
tort which at common law must be brought in the joint names of herself 
and husband.”183  The Court reasoned that a different construction of the 
statute would “open the doors of the courts to accusations of all sorts of 
one spouse against the other, and bring into public notice complaints for 
assault, slander and libel, and alleged injuries to property of the one or 
the other, by husband against wife or wife against husband.”184 
The Court passed judgment on such legislation and opined that 
Congress was aware of the “radical changes in the policy of centuries 
which such legislation as is here suggested would bring about.”185  
While conceding that it was within the power of the legislature to alter 
the law, the court would not give full effect to this intent.186  “Such 
radical and far-reaching changes should only be wrought by language so 
clear and plain as to be unmistakable evidence of the legislative 
 
 180. Cole, 44 Ill. 58, 1867 WL 5096, at *4. 
 181. Id.  In determining whether the statute at issue allowed a married woman to convey her 
real property without joining her husband to the deed, the court reasoned: 
If this language is to receive a literal interpretation, a married woman . . . would have the 
right to forbid her husband to enter upon the premises, and he would be a trespasser . . . . 
The wife could thus divorce her husband . . . without the aid of a court of chancery.  Or 
again, suppose in a house thus owned and occupied, the furniture is also the wife’s 
property. Can she forbid the husband the use of such portion as she may choose, allow 
him to occupy only a particular chair, and to take from the shelves of the library a book 
only upon her permission?  This would be all very absurd, and we know the legislature 
had no idea of enacting a law to be thus interpreted. 
Id. 
 182. 218 U.S. 611, 619-20 (1910).  In that case, a wife brought suit against her husband to 
recover for assault and battery.  Id. at 615.  She alleged that the husband had beaten her over the 
course of several days, knowing at the time that she had been pregnant. Id. at 620. 
 183. Id. at 617. 
 184. Id. at 619 (“[I]t was not the intention of Congress, in the enactment of the District of 
Columbia Code, to revolutionize the law governing the relation of husband and wife as between 
themselves.”). 
 185. Id. at 618 (“It must be presumed that the legislators who enacted this statute were familiar 
with the long-established policy of the common law, and were not unmindful of the radical changes 
in the policy of centuries which such legislation as is here suggested would bring about.”). 
 186. Id. at 618. 
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intention.”187  If the legislature had decided to permit wives to bring suit 
against their husbands for injuries, “it would have been easy to have 
expressed that intent in terms of irresistible clearness.”188 
The Court constrained the more radical implications of the marriage 
reform statutes and sought to prevent wives from bringing questions of 
spousal violence into the courts.189  In this way, the Court refused to 
provide women with a remedy against their violent partners in order to 
preserve the spousal dynamic in the household and in society.190 
Akin to the evolutionary nature of the Married Women’s Property 
Acts that eventually improved women’s legal rights,191 the social 
movements that have drastically changed domestic violence law in the 
last few decades have caused legislatures to fashion new legal remedies 
for victims of domestic violence.192  Legislatures have fortified court-
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.  See also Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1865). In Freethy, the 
court stated: 
It is true, as has been suggested, that if the act was not intended to authorize such suits 
against the husband, he might have been excluded from its operation by express words; 
but it is also true, and I think more reasonable to suppose, that if the legislature had 
intended to include such suits, it would have used language clearly denoting such 
intention. 
Id. 
 189. See Siegel, supra note 176, at 1117.  Reva Siegel explains that the legal system justified 
the inconsistency of the law, granting women rights but restricting them as against their husbands, 
by pointing to public policy concerns.  Id. at 1118.  She explains: 
[M]arriage was an affective relation that subsisted and flourished in a private domain 
beyond the reach of the law.  A wife could not enforce a contract with her husband 
compensating her for work performed in the family sphere because such labor was to be 
performed altruistically, rather than self-interestedly: for love, not pay.  A wife could not 
bring a tort claim against a husband who battered her because such conflicts were to be 
resolved altruistically, by marital partners who would, or should, learn to forgive and 
forget.  Adjudication of intramarital contract or tort claims, courts reasoned, would 
destroy marital harmony and expose private aspects of the conjugal relation to the 
corrosive glare of public scrutiny.  Thus, with the reform of marital status law, the 
discourse of marital status began to shift from the language of hierarchy to the language 
of inferiority. 
Id. at 1118 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 190. HARTOG, supra note 171, at 293 (noting that Longendyke v. Longendyke, infra note 235, 
deemed a wife’s tort suit against her husband to be “destructive of that conjugal union and 
tranquillity, which it has always been the object of the law to guard and protect”).  Thompson v. 
Thompson, 31 App. D.C. 557, 560 (1908) (stating its unwillingness to “undermine the basis of 
society by disregarding sanctity in the home”). 
 191. Tobias, supra note 7, at 382-83 (describing the amendment process as “evolutionary” and 
recognizing as plausible the argument that the Acts “eroded unity, enhanced wives’ legal status, or 
emancipated them and, thus, altered the notion of tort immunity”). 
 192. See generally Peter K. Manning, The Preventive Conceit: The Black Box in Market 
Context, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 83 (Eve. S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa 
eds., 1996). 
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issued protection orders, mandating arrest when police officers have 
probable cause to believe an order has been violated.193 
However, when faced with a revolutionary legislative mechanism 
for combating domestic violence, the Supreme Court in Town of Castle 
Rock v. Gonzales refused to give effect to the Colorado court’s promise 
of mandatory protection.194  The Court succumbed to the common law 
and coverture’s legacy and denied Jessica Gonzales a meaningful 
remedy for domestic violence.195  The Court articulated new Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process jurisprudence while ignoring the clear intent of 
the Colorado legislature in the name of traditional police discretion.196 
C. Thompson’s Rationale Pervades the Court’s Opinion in Castle Rock 
Mrs. Thompson, the plaintiff in Thompson v. Thompson,197 sought 
relief, asking the Court to remove the legal obstacles preventing her 
from utilizing a civil remedy for the assault inflicted upon her by her 
husband.198  She asked the Court to give plain meaning to the statute and 
apply it accordingly.199  The Court closed the doors of the court to her 
claims for redress against her husband, depriving her of a remedy for her 
injuries.200  Similarly, Jessica Gonzales asked the Court to require the 
executive branch to give legal effect to her court-issued protection 
order.201  She requested that the Court read the mandatory-arrest statute 
underlying her remedy plainly, thus recognizing her entitlement to its 
enforcement.202  The Court refused to do so and stripped her protection 
order of any remedial meaning.203 
The dissenters in Thompson criticized the majority opinion, 
 
 193. Miller, supra note 91. 
 194. See Roederer, supra note 164, at 118. 
 195. Id. (“By writing in ‘may’ to a statute that stated ‘shall,’ the Court has chosen the liberty of 
police officers to arbitrarily ignore their duties to enforce court ordered restraining orders over the 
safety and security of the victims of domestic violence.”). 
 196. See Gostin, supra note 156, at 10 (stating that viewing as discretionary police enforcement 
of restraining orders was “a strained interpretation of state law”).  See Roederer, supra note 164, at 
94 (stating that in spite of the statute’s plain language, history and purpose, the Supreme Court 
found that police had discretion, “almost as a matter of constitutional law,” to arbitrarily ignore 
restraining orders). 
 197. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910). 
 198. Id. at 614. 
 199. Id. at 611 (“A statute will not be so construed that remote inferences withdraw a case from 
its general provisions which is clearly within its words and perfectly consistent with its intent.”). 
 200. Id. at 619. 
 201. See Roederer, supra note 165, at 326-27. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Roederer, supra note 164, at 93-94. 
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warning that the majority’s construction of the statute would have “the 
effect to defeat the clearly expressed will of the legislature by a 
construction of its words that cannot be reconciled with their ordinary 
meaning.”204  Likewise, in Castle Rock, the Supreme Court defeated the 
Colorado legislature’s clearly expressed intention to mandate the 
enforcement of court-issued protection orders.205 
The Colorado statute at issue strayed from common law 
principles.206  “Under the common law, the State does not have a duty to 
come to the aid of another and people do not have a right for the state to 
come to their assistance to protect them from harm caused by other 
people.”207  In order to overcome the common law rule, the Colorado 
legislature created a statute that “imposes a special duty on the entity for 
a particular class of persons.”208 
However, the Court did “not believe that these provisions of 
Colorado law truly made enforcement of restraining orders 
mandatory.209  [A] well established tradition of police discretion has 
long coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest statutes.”210  Like the 
Thompson court demanded, the Court in Castle Rock required clearer 
language on the part of the Colorado legislature to elicit an interpretation 
of the statute as mandatory.211 
 
 204. 218 U.S. at 623-24  (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Justices Holmes and Hughes joined Justice 
Harlan’s dissent.  Id. 
 205. The Colorado House Judiciary Hearings on House Bill 1253 provide: 
Recognizing domestic abuse as an exceedingly important social ill, lawmakers: 
wanted to put together a bill that would really attack the domestic violence problems. . . 
and that is that the perpetrator has to be held accountable for his actions, and that the 
victim needs to be made to feel safe.  First of all, . . . the entire criminal justice system 
must act in a consistent manner, which does not now occur.  The police must make 
probable cause arrests.  The prosecutors must prosecute every case.  Judges must apply 
appropriate sentences, and probation officers must monitor their probationers closely.  
And the offender needs to be sentenced to offender-specific therapy.  So this means the 
entire system must send the same message and enforce the same moral values, and that is 
abuse is wrong and violence is criminal.  And so we hope that House Bill 1253 starts us 
down this road. 
Brief for the Respondent at 21, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-
278) (quoting Transcript of the Colorado House Judiciary Hearings on House Bill 1253, Feb. 15, 
1994).  See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 784 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[I]nnovation of the domestic violence statutes was to make police enforcement, not ‘more 
mandatory,’ but ‘simply mandatory.’”). 
 206. Roederer, supra note 165, at 324. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 325. 
 209. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 760 (emphasis in original). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 761 (“Against that backdrop [of police discretion], a true mandate of police action 
would require some stronger indication from the Colorado Legislature than ‘shall use every 
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The Colorado statute “derogated the common law” public duty 
doctrine.212  As the Court was not prepared to recognize a right that 
would significantly alter police officers’ duties, the Court read the 
statute strictly and narrowly, refusing to apply the plain meaning of the 
statute.213  “Mandatory” does not mean “mandatory” when it infringes 
upon police officer discretion, despite the legislature’s clear intention for 
the language to mean just that.214  The Court substituted its own policy 
judgments for those of the Colorado legislature.215  The Colorado 
legislature created an entitlement to enforcement of civil protection 
orders to which the Supreme Court should have afforded Due Process 
protection.216 
D. A Devastating Interpretation of Federal Constitutional Law 
“Property,” as a legal concept, evades static definition.217  The 
Constitution does not determine which interests constitute property 
interests.218  State legislatures have the power to create property interests 
and to define their dimensions.219  A person has a property interest in 
 
reasonable means to enforce a restraining order’”).  Petitioner Castle Rock advocated this point 
during oral argument.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 152, at 16 (“I think we need a 
much clearer statement from the Colorado legislature itself, both that it’s written in terms of the 
beneficiary – getting her an entitlement against the police, rather than in terms of what the person 
restrained is.”). 
 212. See Roederer, supra note 164, at 98-100. 
 213. Id. at 98-99, 105-12. 
 214. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 760-61; Roederer, supra note 164, at 105. 
 215. Id. at 118. 
 216. Id. at 94-95. 
 217. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust, Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).  In Mullane, 
the Court held: 
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process 
Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, 
liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case. 
Id.  “The bundle of power and privileges to which we give the name of ownership is not constant 
though the ages.  The faggots must be put together and rebound from time to time.”  Emily Field 
Van Tassel, Rebinding the Sticks: A Comment on Is Coventure Dead?, 82 GEO. L.J. 2291, 2291 
(1994) (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928)).  See Board 
of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972) (stating that “property [is a] broad 
and majestic term[ ]. . . property interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond 
actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money”). 
 218. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
 219. Id. (“[Property interests] are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law – rules or understandings 
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”).  But see 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 152 at 14.  Justice Scalia strips states of this discretion, 
stating, “Perhaps what you mean is that what is a property interest for purposes of Colorado law, if 
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benefits to which that person “has a legitimate claim of entitlement.”220  
The State creates entitlement when it promises a service or a benefit.221  
When the Colorado legislature fortified its civil protection orders222 by 
including language that mandated arrest or other appropriate action, the 
state entitled the holder of the protection order to its proper 
enforcement.223  “Police protection against violence is as valuable as 
other government services or benefits.”224  In this way, the Colorado 
legislature placed the court-issued civil protection order within the 
protection of the Due Process clause.225 
Various notions of property have been found to require Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process protection.226  In many instances, intangible 
property such as a driver’s license,227 disability benefits,228 welfare 
benefits,229 and a horse trainer’s license230 has been granted protected 
status.  Significantly, Due Process has been afforded to civil litigants 
who seek recourse in the courts as plaintiffs attempting to address 
grievances.231  A cause of action is property which may be converted 
into one’s possession by judgment or order.232 
 
Colorado chooses to nominate some utterly zany thing of a property interest, it doesn’t necessarily 
mean that it’s a property interest for purposes of the Federal Constitution.”  Id. 
 220. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. 
 221. Gostin, supra note 156, at 10-11 (“If the state had promised its eligible citizens a service 
(such as education) or a benefit (such as Medicaid), clearly an ‘entitlement’ would exist”).  See also 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (finding that where Ohio law provided for free public 
education and compulsory school attendance, school officials could not suspend students without 
affording them procedural due process protection). 
 222. See Gonzales v. Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1108 (2004), rev’d, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) 
(“Colorado legislature clearly wanted to alter the fact that the police were not enforcing domestic 
abuse restraining orders.”). 
 223. The Court’s argument that mandatory arrest statutes are not really mandatory does not 
stand on solid ground.  See supra note 214. 
 224. Gostin, supra note 156, at 11.  “Police enforcement of a restraining order is a government 
service that is no less concrete and no less valuable than other government services, such as 
education.”  Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 790 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 225. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 790 (“Colorado law guaranteed the provision of a certain 
service, in certain defined circumstances, to a certain class of beneficiaries, and respondent 
reasonably relied on that guarantee.”) (emphasis in original). 
 226. Id. at 789-90. 
 227. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
 228. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 229. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 230. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979). 
 231. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982) (recognizing that due process 
protection extends to causes of action as well as access to the courts). 
 232. See Prosser v. Prosser, 102 S.E. 787, 788 (S.C. 1920) (stating that a tort giving a woman a 
claim for damages is property, which she may by action reduce into her possession); Brown v. 
Brown, 89 A. 889, 892 (Conn. 1914). 
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When our legal system began to break down the formal laws of 
coverture, it gradually allowed women to bring lawsuits.233  Statutes and 
case law existing during this time expressly recognized that judgments 
arising from such lawsuits constituted the woman’s “sole and separate 
property.”234  As courts began to interpret the Married Women’s 
Property Acts, many concluded that women could not bring actions in 
tort against their husbands to redress the abuse inflicted upon them.235  
Interspousal tort immunity obstructed women from receiving a remedy 
for their abuse and so the civil protection order was created.236  The civil 
protection order, effectuated by its mandatory arrest language, 
commands due process protection for the victims of domestic 
violence.237  
The Supreme Court denied Jessica Gonzales due process protection 
by stripping her court-issued protection order of value.238  The Court 
ignored the fundamental principle that “deprivations of law require 
remedies.”239  Finding that Jessica Gonzales did not have a 
 
 233. See Prosser, 102 S.E. at 788 (acknowledging a wife’s right to recover damages for 
injuries to her person, or for other torts sustained by her, against her husband). 
 234. See  Johnson v. Johnson, 77 So. 335, 338 (Ala. 1917); Musselman v. Galligher, 32 Iowa 
383, 384 (1871); Patterson v. Franklin, 84 S.E. 18, 19 (N.C. 1915); Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 
206 (N.C. 1920); Bogen v. Bogen, 12 S.E.2d 649, 650 (N.C. 1941); Hamstetler v. Duke Power Co., 
32 S.E.2d 611, 612 (N.C. 1945), overruled by Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 266 
S.E.2d 818 (N.C. 1980); King v. Gates, 57 S.E.2d 765, 767 (N.C. 1950), superseded by statute as 
stated in Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 266 S.E.2d 818, 820 (N.C. 1980); Fiedler 
v. Fiedler, 140 P. 1022, 1024 (Okla. 1914); Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 150 N.W.2d 
137, 143 (Wis. 1967); 
 235. See Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1863); Thompson v. 
Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910). 
 236. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.  The civil protection order is remedial in 
nature.  See United States v. Harrison, 461 F.2d 1209, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Judge Ryan’s 
comments on the enactment of legislation providing for civil protection orders: “[t]he paramount 
consideration concerning this legislation is that it is remedial.  It is designed to provide a remedy 
where no remedy heretofore existed”). 
 237. See Stark, supra note 80, at 120 (stating that pro-arrest policies give women power “to 
command greater due process in and of itself”) (emphasis in original). 
 238. See Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy 
Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1636-40 (2004) (arguing that the right to a 
remedy is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
The right to a remedy was specifically recognized at common law in 1703, when the Chief Justice 
of the Kings Bench in Ashby v. White stated: 
If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it, 
and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and indeed it is a vain 
thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for . . . want of right and want of remedy are 
reciprocal . . . Where a man has but one remedy to come at his right, if he loses that he 
loses his right. 
Id. at 1637 (quoting Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1703)). 
 239. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).  See John C.P. Goldberg, 
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constitutionally protected entitlement to the enforcement of her 
protection order, the Court prevented the values and mandates espoused 
by the Colorado legislature from having legal meaning.240  “Legal 
obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in 
the law but that are elusive to the grasp.”241  The Court was required to 
provide Jessica Gonzales a meaningful remedy for the deprivation of her 
court-issued protection order.242 
“Our judicial system . . . is premised on the universally accepted 
principle that court judgments have meaning and that judicial 
pronouncements will be backed up by all necessary enforcement actions 
that may be required to ensure compliance with the law.”243  In 
connection with her divorce action, Jessica Gonzales received a 
protection order against her ex-husband, Simon Gonzales.244  The 
protection order, itself, ordered the police to arrest Simon Gonzales in 
the event of its breach.245 
 
The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of 
Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 529 (arguing for recognition of a right to a body of law, grounded in 
the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause, empowering individuals to seek redress against harm). 
 240. See Thomas, supra note 238, at 1638 (“Rights standing alone are simply expressions of 
social values . . . [i]t is the remedy that defines the right by making the value real and tangible by 
providing specificity and concreteness to otherwise abstract guarantees.”).  Professor Thomas 
exemplifies this idea by discussing how, in the school desegregation cases, the right involved was 
school students’ right to equal protection of the laws and “the ordered remedies defined this right by 
providing meaningful contours to the right by prohibiting the racial assignment of students, 
requiring integrated schools, and redressing realities causally related to segregation.”  Id. at 1638-
39. 
 241. Id. at 1639 (quoting De La Rama S.S. Co. v. United States, 344 U.S. 386, 390 (1953)) 
(quoting The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922)).  Professor Thomas also states that 
“[w]ithout remedies, rights are mere ideals, promises, or pronouncements that may or may not be 
followed.”.  Id. 
 242. See id. at 1638 (stating that state constitutional rights to a remedy “were adopted to ensure 
the independence of the judicial against corruption and control by the other political branches”).  
“The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause requires state courts to provide a 
successful plaintiff with a minimally adequate remedy that provides ‘meaningful’ relief.”  Id. at 
1641.  But see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 152, at 10 (advocating that Jessica Gonzales 
had the remedy of a contempt proceeding available to vindicate the violation of her protection 
order). 
 243. Thomas, supra note 238 at 1640 (“The enforcement component of a remedy is its critical 
aspect that distinguishes it from an idea that actualizes the right in a tangible manner.”).  See also 
United States ex. rel. Goldman v. Meredith, 596 F.2d 1353, 1359 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that the 
court could not “create a sanctuary for judgment debtors” by shielding book-entry accounts from 
judicial process). 
 244. Gonzales v. Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1261. 
 245. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court dismissed the significance of the court-issued 
protection order, stating that “[t]he critical language in the restraining order came not from any part 
of the order itself (which was signed by the state-court trial judge and directed to the restrained 
party, respondent’s husband), but from the preprinted notice to law-enforcement personnel that 
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Perhaps what makes Jessica Gonzales’ property right perplexing is 
that, in order for it to have been satisfied, it required executive action.246  
However, many court judgments require execution247 for their 
satisfaction.248  When a judgment debtor’s property becomes 
encumbered by a judgment lien, a sheriff is often required to carry out an 
execution sale.249  Additionally, courts have power to issue a variety of 
orders that require officers of the executive branch of government to 
arrest individuals.250 
“The power to enforce the performance of the act must rest 
somewhere.”251  The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Colorado 
statute and protection order converted the remedial mandates of civil 
protection orders in the domestic violence context into “mere 
description[s] of favored behavior.”252 
E. The Court Should Have Considered the Reasoning Employed By 
Other Courts 
In deciding Castle Rock, the Supreme Court failed to meaningfully 
consider how other jurisdictions interpreted mandatory arrest statutes 
and upheld protection orders.253  The Tenth Circuit took notice of courts 
 
appeared on the back of the order.”  Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 758 (2005). 
 246. Id. at 758-59. 
 247. Execution is defined as “[a] court order directing a sheriff or other officer to enforce a 
judgment, usu[ally] by seizing and selling the judgment debtor’s property.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 467 (7th ed. 2000). 
 248. Justice Ginsburg made this point during oral argument.  Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 152, at 9 (“This is a court order that enforcement officials carry out . . . How does it 
differ from, say, a money judgment and . . . levying execution on property?”). 
 249. An execution sale is “[a] forced sale of a debtor’s property by a government official 
carrying out a writ of execution.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1074 (7th ed. 2000). 
 250. A body execution is “[a] court order requiring an officer to take a named person into 
custody, usu[ally] to bring the person before the court to pay a debt.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
467 (7th ed. 2000).  A close-jail execution is “[a] body execution stating that the person to be 
arrested should be confined in jail without the privilege of movement about the jailyard.”  Id. 
 251. Thomas, supra note 238 at 1640 (quoting Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 
624 (1838)). 
 252. See id (“Neutralizing a right by eliminating its remedy and converting it into a mere 
description of favored behavior effectively nullifies the attendant right and deprives the courts of the 
ability to protect our legal rights”). 
 253. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).  But see Brief for the 
Petitioner, supra note 153, at 21 (citing case law such as Doe ex. rel. Nelson v. Milwaukee County, 
903 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1990), Doe ex. rel. Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 
1996), Jones v. Union County, 296 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2002), for the proposition that “[e]very other 
circuit to have considered the issue has rejected the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning”).  The cases cited to 
by petitioner, however, are not domestic violence cases and do not involve court orders.  See 
Nelson, 903 F.2d at 500; Fein, 93 F.3d at 863; Jones, 296 F.3d at 421. 
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that found that a court order creates an entitlement subject to procedural 
due process protections.254  For example, in Coffman v. Wilson Police 
Department,255 the United States District Court for the District of 
Pennsylvania recognized that a court order creates a property right.256  
Further, the court held that this particular “order of the court create[d] a 
property interest in police enforcement” that is cognizable under the Due 
Process Clause.257 
An order of the court, served upon the police department, stating 
that the department “shall”258 enforce the order, created an 
entitlement.259  The protection order warranted protection, giving 
Coffman the right to a reasonable police response.260  Significantly, the 
 
 254. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1102 (10th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 545 U.S. 
748 (2005). 
 255. 739 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Pa. 1990).  In Coffman, Terry L. Coffman had been granted a 
protection order pursuant to the Pennsylvania Protection From Abuse Act against her husband who 
often physically and mentally abused her.  Id. at 259.  The protection order contained mandatory 
language, instructing officers that they “shall enforce” the order.  Id.  Coffman’s husband breached 
this court order, harming her within her home, and thereafter continued to violate the court order.  
Id. at 259-60.  The police did not take action to enforce her court order.  Id.  Finally, Coffman’s 
husband shot her in the chin and throat.  Id. at 260.  Coffman brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, alleging that “the governmental defendants, by failing to arrest or restrain [her husband] 
deprived Coffman of her entitlement to police protection under the Protection From Abuse Act and 
therefore violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id.  See 
also Siddle v. City of Cambridge, 761 F. Supp. 503 (S.D. Ohio 1991).  In Siddle, a woman had 
obtained a protection order against her abusive husband, preventing him from “abusing, beating, 
molesting or assaulting” her.  Id. at 505.  The court found that the protection order was a protected 
property interest.  Id. at 509-10. 
 256. Coffman, 739 F. Supp. at 264 (noting that if a court order did not create a property right, 
“much of the work of this, or any other court, would be nugatory . . . civil disputes are referred to 
courts precisely because the court can issue an order that compels one person to hand property to 
another”). 
 257. Id. at 264. 
 258. Id.  The court stated that “[t]he word “shall” is mandatory, not precatory, and its use in a 
simple declarative sentence brooks no contrary interpretation.” Id. 
 259. Id.  The court explained how the order constituted a Roth-type property interest: 
Although, in the context of Roth, property interests generally arise from sources other 
than judicial orders, it is in no way remarkable that an order could create an entitlement.  
After all, courts have held that employment contracts can create property interests 
removable only by due process of law.  See, e.g. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 
601-03, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972).  Courts are more clearly sources of state 
law than are middle-ranking functionaries in a college employment office.  Furthermore, 
the court derived its power to issue orders from the legislature.  Although the legislature 
did not itself grant a protectible interest, it enabled the court to create one (just as the 
legislature may not have created an interest in continued employment by a state 
employee, but may have empowered a state actor to create such an interest by issuing an 
employment contract). 
Id. 
 260. Id. at 266 (“The plaintiff’s property right is to a reasoned police response; if the 
Department failed to dispatch a vehicle because other calls had greater importance, then her interest, 
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court stated that scope of plaintiff’s entitlement was defined by proper 
police discretion and that its holding did not run the risk of opening the 
courtroom doors to a deluge of litigation.261 
F. Coverture’s Legacy: The Implications of Castle Rock on Domestic 
Violence Law 
“[A] protective order that is not enforced is merely an expensive 
piece of paper.”262 
1. Thompson’s Legacy: The Interspousal Immunity Doctrine 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson led many states to 
adhere to the interspousal immunity doctrine.263  Thompson closed the 
doors of justice for many years to married women seeking recourse 
against their husbands.264  Thompson condoned the unwillingness of 
state judiciaries to unveil the problem of domestic violence, which 
allowed the problem to persist.265 
However, unlike Castle Rock, Thompson’s effects were limited to 
state substantive law and, therefore, states were free to reject the Court’s 
reasoning.266  While many courts adopted the doctrine recognized by 
Thompson, the opinion led many state judiciaries to eventually discredit 
 
though not her wish has been fulfilled.”). 
 261. Id. (“There is . . . a great deal of discretion in police work, and so the property right here is 
not reducible to a sum certain,” but “[t]he well-developed body of case law and practice that 
governs proper police response makes the scope of this property interest certain enough to be 
protectible.”). 
 262. Truss, supra note 83, at 1202. 
 263. See Boblitz v. Boblitz, 462 A.2d 506, 510 (Md. 1983), modified, Bozman v. Bozman, 830 
A.2d 450, 454 (Md. 2003).  The Court noted: 
Under the guidance of the majority position in Thompson, . . . [in] . . . 1965 the Supreme 
Court of Ohio in Lyons v. Lyons, 208 N.E.2d 533, 536-37 (Ohio 1965), [overruled by 
Shearer v. Shearer, 480 N.E.2d 388, 393 (Ohio 1985)], declared, “This court is not 
convinced that a useful purpose would be served in overthrowing the rule of interspousal 
immunity from suit so well established in a majority of jurisdictions in this country.” 
Id.  See Tobias, supra note 7, at 408-09 (1989) (marking Thompson as “a watershed for interspousal 
tort immunity.”). 
 264. See Boblitz, 462 A.2d at 510 (noting that it was not until 1965 that courts began to depart 
from the rule stated in Thompson).  Those still adhering to the rule include: Georgia (see Larkin v. 
Larkin, 601 S.E.2d 487 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)) and Louisiana (see Hamilton v. Hamilton, 522 So.2d 
1356, 1359 (La. Ct. App. 1988)).  Today, the doctrine is widely criticized.  See Bozman, 830 A.2d at 
466 (stating “[t]he majority of the States, we discovered, were of the view that the doctrine was 
outdated and served no useful purpose, that ‘there presently exists no cogent or logical reason why 
the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity should be continued’”). 
 265. See Siegel, supra note 77. 
 266. Boblitz, 462 A.2d at 510-15 (surveying trend away from Thompson reasoning). 
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these policy concerns and abrogate the doctrine of interspousal 
immunity.267 
 
 267. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Romo, 646 P.2d 878, 881-82 (Ariz. 1982) (in banc).  The 
Fernandez Court held; 
The doctrine of interspousal tort immunity cannot be supported by an antiquated and 
narrow ‘unity’ doctrine that perpetuates the fiction of female disability if not 
inferiority. . . it cannot operate today as a reason for supporting the doctrine of 
interspousal tort immunity . . . . We do not believe. . . that the family harmony or 
domestic tranquility will be harmed by allowing suit for injuries. 
Id.  See Windauer v. O’Connor, 485 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Ariz. 1971) (“An intentional tort inflicted by 
one spouse on another so clearly destroys the concept of unity that the basis for the doctrine is 
lost.”); Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. 1962) (adopting the reasoning of Self v. Self, 376 P.2d 
65 (Cal. 1962), and stating that “[t]he argument about inundating the Courts with trifling suits is 
palpably unsound”).  In Brown v. Brown, 89 A. 889, 891 (Conn. 1914), the court held: 
If a cause of action in her favor arises from the wrongful infliction of such injuries upon 
her by another, why does not the wrongful infliction of such injuries by her husband now 
give her a cause of action against him?  If she may sue him for a broken promise, why 
may she not sue him for a broken arm? . . . . In the fact that the wife has a cause of action 
against her husband for wrongful injuries to her person or property committed by him, 
we see nothing which is injurious to the public, or against the public good, or against 
good morals. 
Id.  See also Flagg v. Loy, 734 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Kan 1987) (“Does the doctrine of interspousal tort 
immunity promote and protect family harmony and tranquility?  We think not.”); Brown v. Gosser, 
262 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. 1953) (“[The legislature] has enunciated the public policy of the 
state . . . . It is not a function of the courts to enunciate a contrary policy.”); Burns v. Burns, 518 
So.2d. 1205, 1210 (Miss. 1988) (“The idea that maintenance of interspousal immunity will promote 
the public interest in domestic tranquility is wholly illusory.”); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 
951, 959 (N.J. 1978) (“The threat to domestic harmony posed by a legal action between spouses is 
an imponderable; the cohesiveness of a marriage may be jeopardized as much by barring a cause as 
by allowing it.”); Shearer v. Shearer, 480 N.E.2d 388, 391 (Ohio 1985) (“To continue to deny 
access to the courts on the grounds of ‘what may be,’ in the face of overwhelming experience to the 
contrary in the many other states, is nothing more than a denial of due process.”); Coffindaffer v. 
Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338, 342 (W. Va. 1978) (“[I]t is difficult to perceive how any law barring 
access to the courts for personal injuries will promote harmony.”); In MacDonald v. MacDonald, 
412 A.2d 71, 74 (Me. 1980) the court discussed how stare decisis applied to the doctrine of 
interspousal tort immunity: 
In recent years, too, we have forcefully stated that in matters of tort involving the marital 
relationship we cannot “stubbornly, hollowly and anachronistically” stay bound by the 
“shackles” of the “formalisms” of the common law.  We have also stressed the by so 
declaring, we do not undermine the principle of stare decisis.  Rather, we prevent it from 
defeating itself; we do not permit it to mandate the mockery of reality and the “cultural 
lag of unfairness and injustice” which would arise if the judges of the present, who like 
their predecessors cannot avoid acting when called upon, were required to act as captives 
of the judges of the past, restrained without power to break even those bonds so withered 
by the changes of time that at the slightest tough they would crumble. 
MacDonald, 412 A.2d at 74; Boblitz, 462 A.2d at 517 (internal citations omitted).  Dean Prosser 
stated: 
The chief reason relied upon by all these courts, however, is that personal tort actions 
between husband and wife would disrupt and destroy the peace and harmony of the 
home, which is against the policy of the law.  This is on the bald theory that after a 
husband has beaten his wife, there is a state of peace and harmony left to be disturbed; 
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2. The Likely Impact of Castle Rock 
Like the “alternative remedies” suggested by the Court in 
Thompson, the “alternative remedies” suggested by the Court in Castle 
Rock are likely to have a hollow ring.268  By finding that a protection 
order is not worthy of the Constitution’s safeguards, Castle Rock has 
stripped the victims of domestic abuse of another means of protection.269  
Now a lasting component of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, 
Castle Rock will have devastating effects.  The early cases following 
Castle Rock confirm this fear.270 
 
and that if she is sufficiently injured or angry to sue him for it, she will be soothed and 
deterred from reprisals by denying her the legal remedy – and this even though she has 
left him or divorced him for that very ground, and although the same courts refuse to 
find any disruption of domestic tranquility if she sues him for a tort to her property, or 
brings a criminal prosecution against him.  If this reasoning appeals to the reader, let him 
by all means adopt it. 
Boblitz, 462 A.2d at 520 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 862-63 (4th Ed. H.B. 
1978)). 
 268. See Boblitz, 462 A.2d at 509 (“The available ‘alternative remedies’ suggested by the 
[Thompson] Court have a hollow ring.”); See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 152, at 16 
(stating that Colorado law provides several alternative remedies to Mrs. Gonzales in the absence of 
procedural due process protection).  Petitioner Castle Rock explained that when a restraining order 
is violated, its holder can petition the court for a contempt order against the person who violated the 
order and even the police, if their conduct was willful and wanton.  Id.  In Merenoff v. Merenoff, 
388 A.2d 951 (N.J. 1978), the court stated: 
We add, on a closing note as to the existence of reasons asserted for the continuation of 
the doctrine of interspousal immunity, that no court in this day and age subscribes 
seriously to the view that the abrogation of marital immunity for tortuous injury is 
“unnecessary” because redress for the wrong can be obtained through other means.  This 
additional, “alternative remedy” theory was advanced generations ago as a justification 
for retaining interspousal tort immunity in Thompson v. Thompson, and was even then 
the subject of dissent.  The criminal law may vindicate society’s interest in punishing a 
wrongdoer but it cannot compensate an injured spouse for her or his suffering and 
damages.  Divorce or separation can provide escape from tortuous abuse but can hardly 
be equated with a civil right to redress and compensation for personal injuries. 
Merenoff, 388 A.2d at 962 (internal citations omitted); Boblitz, 462 A.2d at 518 (internal citations 
omitted).  Dean Prosser stated: 
Apart from stare decisis or judicial inertia, and the policy of strict construction of status 
changing the common law, it has been said that each spouse has remedy enough in the 
criminal and divorce law – which obviously is untrue, since neither compensates for the 
damage done, or covers all the torts that may be committed. 
Id. at 520 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 862-63 (4th Ed. H.B. 1978)). 
 269. See Roederer, supra note 164, at 93 (observing that the Supreme Court views the 
Constitution as “a charter of negative liberties” and “will go to great lengths to conserve the status 
quo distribution of rights and entitlements”). 
 270. See, e.g., Starr v. Price, 385 F. Supp. 2d 502, 512 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (finding that, in light of 
Castle Rock, plaintiff’s Protection From Abuse Order “did not create a legitimate entitlement to its 
enforcement”); Caldwell v. City of Louisville, No. 3:01CV-195-S, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20640, at 
*5 (W.D. Ky. 2005), rev’d, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 23719 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that Castle Rock 
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The legal system fails to provide victims of domestic violence with 
any real protection.271  Officers of the executive branch must enforce 
protection orders; however, the judiciary, as demonstrated in Castle 
Rock, does not wish to make sure that the executive branch carries out 
this duty.272 
In some jurisdictions, interspousal tort immunity prevents an 
abused spouse from seeking an individualized legal remedy for her 
injuries.273  In all jurisdictions, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prevents an individual 
from bringing suit a governmental actor having qualified immunity.274  
As a protection order does not enjoy due process protection, an abused 
spouse that has obtained a court-issued protection order has no remedy 
against police officers who refuse to enforce her judgment.275  Police 
departments throughout the country are persistently unwilling to enforce 
protection orders.  Therefore, a protection order in the hands of an 
abused spouse may now be valueless, embodying an “empty 
promise.”276 
It does not appear that our government now provides abused 
spouses with a meaningful remedy against domestic violence any more 
 
precluded plaintiff from bringing a procedural due process claim); Howard v. Bayes, 457 F.3d 568, 
576 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A]s was the case in Castle Rock, neither the state legislature nor judiciary has 
affirmatively indicated that the statutes at issue confer an entitlement or property interest on victims 
of domestic abuse.”); Abram v. Busby, No. 3:04-CV-00245 GTE, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8991, at 
*17 (E.D. Ark. 2006) (stating in light of Castle Rock, “Plaintiff’s claim that his due process rights 
were violated fails as a matter of law”). 
 271. See Lewis, supra note 132 (opining that the Castle Rock decision would affect Wisconsin 
“in the sense that a failure to enforce a restraining order or injunction under Wis. Stat. §§ 813.112 
(domestic abuse), 813.22 (child abuse), or 813.125 (harassment) – which all contain the mandatory 
“shall arrest” language similar to the Colorado statute – does not state a cognizable federal 
constitutional claim”). 
 272. Cf. William Spieler, Editorial, Self-Defense and Self-Determination Under the Gun, 
WASH. POST, July 5, 2005, at A12 (criticizing any opponents to Congress’ efforts to overturn the 
D.C. handgun ban).  Spieler cites Castle Rock for the proposition that the government has no 
affirmative duty to protect its citizens.  Id.  Spieler voices his concerns on that issue by stating 
“[i]t’s one thing to be reminded that you aren’t due any protection and that the police can legally 
ignore 911 calls.  It’s another to be simultaneously told that you cannot have the means in your own 
hands to effectively defend yourself.”  Id. 
 273. See supra note 264. 
 274. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841-42 (1998). 
 275. To succeed in a § 1983 claim, the abused spouse would have to show that she was 
deprived of a constitutional right by a person acting under color of state law.  See Jacobs, Visconsi 
& Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 1991).  As demonstrated by the 
Castle Rock opinion, it is invariably difficult to successfully aver a cause of action against such state 
actors. 
 276. See Gostin, supra note 156, at 11 (stating that when the state establishes an agency to 
prevent spousal abuse, it promises that it will respond in cases of obvious threats to health). 
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than it did in 1910.277  State legislatures must now contemplate a means 
to achieve their policies, which may prove difficult without assistance 
from the judiciary in enforcing new legislation.278 
G. A Failure of Separation of Powers: Courts Must Raise the Curtain on 
Domestic Violence 
“Legal remedies are an essential tool in stopping domestic 
violence.”279  Victims of domestic violence will only have true recourse 
against their abusers when all branches of government work together to 
provide a meaningful remedy.280  “[O]ur . . . system imposes upon the 
Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of 
interdependence as well as independence the absence of which ‘would 
preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself 
effectively.’”281  As Madison explained, separation of powers does not 
mean that the branches “ought to have no partial agency in, or no 
 
 277. See generally Siegel, supra note 77. 
 278. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768-69 (2005) (stating that states are 
not “powerless to provide victims with personally enforceable remedies”).  While § 1983 “did not 
create a system by which police departments are generally held financially accountable for crimes 
that better policing might have prevented, the people of Colorado are free to craft such a system 
under state law.”  Id. 
 279. Lerman, supra note 36, at 220. 
 280. See id. at 221: 
Failure of coordination will cause the failure of any individual remedy.  For example, if a 
statute requires the police to make arrests but the police department does not adopt a 
policy implementing the statute, the officers responding to calls may not even be aware 
of the statute.  If a particular department adopts a policy implementing the statute, but 
the officers do not receive adequate training about the nature of woman abuse, they 
either may fail to make arrests or make inappropriate arrests.  If the police are asked to 
make arrests but the prosecutor files charges in few of the arrest cases, the police may 
refuse to act, because they believed that making arrests in cases that will be dropped is a 
pointless exercise.  If the prosecutor adopts a policy of aggressively prosecuting abuse 
cases but fails to provide victim advocacy services to maintain contact with victims, 
attend to their safety needs and help them to understand the law enforcement system, 
then the prosecutor often is doomed to frustration because the victims of abuse are less 
likely to remain available to testify.  If the prosecutor sets up a good system within the 
office and obtains a high rate of convictions and guilty pleas, but the mental health 
community does not develop expertise on treatment of abusers and establish close 
communication with the courts, then most abusers will receive little effective attention.  
If the probation department fails to monitor abusers who have been convicted of or who 
plead guilty to charges of spouse abuse, then there will be no deterrent to engaging in 
post-conviction recidivism. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 281. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 702 (1997) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361, 381 (1989)). 
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controul over the acts of each other.”282 
The courts must leave policy decisions to the legislature and 
interpret laws according to their plain meaning.283 As Justice Harlan 
stated in his dissent in Thompson, “[w]ith the mere policy, expediency, 
or justice of legislation the courts . . . have no rightful concern.  Their 
duty is only to declare what the law is, not what, in their judgment, it 
ought to be.”284  The legacy of Thompson and the potential implications 
of Castle Rock inform the government that all three branches must work 
together to provide meaningful remedies to the victims of domestic 
abuse.285  It is only then that the victims of domestic abuse will be given 
Due Process of the law.286 
V. CONCLUSION 
From the beginning, violence has shaped the experiences of women 
in the United States.287  Despite legislative movements sparked by social 
change and awareness, our legal system provides no more protection to 
the victims of domestic abuse than it did in 1910.288  While women in 
the United States have gained more political rights, the legal system has 
refused to provide the abused a meaningful remedy for their injuries.289 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Castle Rock290  illustrates that 
more conscious efforts must be made by every branch of the legal 
system to eradicate domestic abuse.291  The entire legal system must 
work together to raise the curtain on domestic violence.292  Legislatures 
must continue to promote social change in the area of domestic violence, 
and courts must enforce legislation without questioning the legislature’s 
 
 282. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 at 325-26 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in 
original). 
 283. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 521 (1981) (“Our judicial function 
is not to second-guess the policy decisions of the legislature, no matter how appealing we may find 
contrary rationales.”); Morrision v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 678 (1988) (“[Separation of powers] 
insur[es] the independence of the Judicial Branch and insur[es] that judges do not encroach upon 
executive or legislative authority or undertake tasks that are more properly accomplished by the 
other branches.”). 
 284. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 622 (1910) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 285. See Schafran, supra note 12. 
 286. See Goldberg, supra note 239. 
 287. See supra notes 20-95 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra notes 262-78 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra notes 233-52, 279-78 and accompanying text. 
 290. 545 U.S. 748 (2005). 
 291. See supra notes 271-75 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra notes 279-86 and accompanying text. 
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policy determinations.293  Police departments must enforce strict policies 
aimed at protecting the abused, while being held accountable when 
failing to provide any measure of protection.  The legal system must 
heed a woman’s pleas for help and prevent court orders from becoming 
mere mockeries.294 
Nicole M. Quester 
 
 293. Id. 
 294. See Legal Momentum, In the Courts: Castle Rock v. Gonzales, http://legalmomentum.org/ 
legalmomentum/inthecourts/2006/03/castle_rock_v_gonzales_125_s_c.php (quoting Jennifer K. 
Brown, Vice President and Legal Director of Legal Momentum: “The world has recognized that 
women and children are entitled to government protection against family violence[,] . . . . [o]ur 
Supreme Court has permitted police to make a mockery of that protection by dismissing women’s 
pleas for help.”). 
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